People v. Bermisa
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Dominador Bermisa was charged with frustrated murder on May 8, 1963. The case proceeded to the Court of First Instance, where an Information was filed on November 26, 1963. After arraignment and a plea of not guilty, the prosecution moved for a provisional dismissal on June 2, 1965, due to the non-appearance of witnesses. The accused and his counsel consented to this provisional dismissal, with costs de oficio. 2. Procedural History: After a lapse of over four years, on September 10, 1969, a new Information for frustrated murder was filed before a different branch of the Court of First Instance. The petitioner moved to quash this second Information, asserting a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied by the trial court on March 3, 1970. The petitioner then filed a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed on August 17, 1970, dissolving the preliminary injunction. 3. The Petition: The petitioner seeks reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision through a Petition for certiorari, arguing that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by the prolonged delay in refiling the case after its provisional dismissal. He contends that the doctrines in Conde vs. Rivera and Kalaw vs. Apostol should have been applied to finally dismiss the criminal case. The Supreme Court is asked to rule on whether the delay in refiling the indictment, following a consented provisional dismissal, constitutes a violation of the right to a speedy trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated due to the delay in refiling the criminal case after its provisional dismissal. Whether the doctrines laid down in Conde vs. Rivera and Kalaw vs. Apostol are applicable to the case at bar.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Ratio Decidendi
On the violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial: The Court held that the right to a speedy trial is not invocable in this case. The delay in refiling the case was not a delay in trial amounting to a violation of a constitutional right, as there was no trial to speak of in the legal sense, there being no indictment yet at the time of the provisional dismissal. The provisional dismissal, entered with the consent of the accused and his counsel, was considered a waiver of his constitutional right not to be prosecuted for the same offense. Such consent implies that the dismissal was not a bar to a subsequent prosecution. The Court reiterated that the right to a speedy trial secures rights to a defendant but does not preclude the rights of public justice, and that the State is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to fairly indict criminals. The delay in refiling was not an inordinate delay after arrest, but rather a delay between a provisional dismissal and a refiling, which is permissible if done within the prescriptive period. On the applicability of cited doctrines: The Court distinguished the present case from Conde vs. Rivera and Kalaw vs. Apostol. In those cases, the delay was in bringing the accused to trial after indictment or after being held to answer. Here, the case was provisionally dismissed with the consent of the accused. The Court emphasized that the right to speedy trial arises when the accused is held to answer, and the delay in refiling after a provisional dismissal, if within the prescriptive period, does not violate this right. The consent to the provisional dismissal was crucial, as it signified a waiver of the right to object to a subsequent refiling, provided it was within the bounds of the law, particularly the prescription of crimes.
Main Doctrine
The provisional dismissal of a criminal case, with the consent of the accused, does not bar the refiling of the case, and the subsequent delay in refiling does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, provided the refiling occurs within the prescriptive period for the offense.