Dineros v. Roque

G.R. No. L-38837 · 1979-02-27 · J. CONCEPCION JR., J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: On December 2, 1959, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a default judgment against La Paz Ice Plant and Cold Storage Co., Inc., ordering it to pay Marciano C. Roque P150,000.00 with interest and attorney's fees. Subsequently, Jose S. Dineros, as receiver of the company, and Ricardo Guerrea filed an action to annul this default judgment. 2. Procedural History: The action to annul the default judgment was filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch VI. After trial, the respondent Judge dismissed the complaint on March 7, 1974. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on April 22, 1974. The private respondents argued that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma and did not suspend the period for appeal. The petitioners then filed a notice of appeal and cash appeal bond on April 24, 1974, and tendered their record on appeal on May 3, 1974. The respondent Judge, on May 21, 1974, ordered the dismissal of the record on appeal, holding that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma and the decision had become final and executory. 3. The Petition: The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court, seeking to compel the respondent Judge to approve and certify their record on appeal. They argued that the respondent Judge erred in holding their motion for reconsideration to be pro forma and in disallowing their record on appeal. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the default judgment. The sole issue presented was whether the motion for reconsideration was pro forma, thereby failing to interrupt the period to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the petitioners' motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1974, was pro forma. Whether the respondent Judge committed an error in holding that the petitioners' motion for reconsideration was pro forma and in disallowing their record on appeal.

Ruling

The petition is dismissed, and the temporary restraining order issued by this Court is dissolved. The respondent Judge correctly ruled that the petitioners' motion for reconsideration was pro forma and that the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of whether the motion for reconsideration was pro forma: The Court reiterated that a motion for reconsideration is addressed to convincing the court that its ruling is erroneous, contrary to law or evidence. Under Rule 37, Section 2, paragraph 3, the movant must specifically point out the findings or conclusions in the judgment that are not supported by evidence or are contrary to law, with express reference to testimonial or documentary evidence or provisions of law. The movant must also explain why it is so. In this case, the petitioners alleged that the issues were not passed upon, the decision did not conform to pleadings and proofs, and was not in accordance with the theory of the action and defense, and in law. However, they failed to specifically point out the findings and conclusions in the decision that were unsupported by evidence or contrary to law. A motion for reconsideration that lacks such specificity is considered pro forma, intended merely to delay proceedings, and does not suspend the period for taking an appeal. The Court cited Alvero vs. De la Rosa and Valdez vs. Jugo in support of this principle, stating that a pro forma motion is a mere scrap of paper that cannot stay the period for appeal. On the issue of whether the respondent Judge erred in disallowing the record on appeal: Under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal must be perfected within thirty (30) days from receipt of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The petitioners received the decision on March 13, 1974, giving them until April 12, 1974, to perfect their appeal. However, they filed their cash appeal bond on April 24, 1974, and their notice of appeal and record on appeal on May 3, 1974. Since their motion for reconsideration was pro forma, it did not suspend the running of the reglementary period. Therefore, their appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. The Court found that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent Judge to approve their record on appeal or establish a clear right to its approval, citing Villamor, et al., vs. Lacson et al. and Llanto vs. Dimaporo.

Main Doctrine

A motion for reconsideration that fails to specifically point out the findings or conclusions in the decision which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law is considered pro forma, does not suspend the running of the period to appeal, and renders the decision final and executory.

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