Correa v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondents were illegally removed from their positions as policemen in Norzagaray, Bulacan. A judgment was rendered ordering defendants Eufemio T. Correa (municipal mayor) and Virgilio Sarmiento (municipal treasurer) to pay the plaintiffs their salaries which they failed to receive by reason of their illegal removal, until they are reinstated. The judgment also permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing an Administrative Order, declared the termination of services illegal, ordered the reinstatement of the plaintiffs, and ordered Correa and Sarmiento to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs' back salaries and costs. Procedural History: The decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and it became final and executory. Petitioner Correa sought to quash a writ of execution issued to enforce the judgment, alleging he was no longer mayor and thus not liable, invoking the principle that the municipality should be liable. The Court of First Instance denied his motion to quash. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and declaratory relief, later amended to implead the Municipality of Norzagaray and the incumbent mayor. The Petition: Petitioner contended that his personal liability for back salaries presupposed his continuance in office, which was not the case, and that the Municipality of Norzagaray should be liable. He argued that his cessation from office constituted a substantial change in circumstances making execution inequitable. He prayed for a declaration that the municipality and the incumbent mayor were liable, and that he was no longer liable, and for the annulment of the denial order.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution. Whether the petitioner, having ceased to be the municipal mayor, is still personally liable for the back salaries of the illegally removed policemen.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The respondent Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to quash the writ of execution.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution: The Court held that the respondent Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The writ of execution was strictly in accordance with the terms of the judgment rendered by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Both courts had categorically stated that the liability of herein petitioner, Eufemio T. Correa, and his co-defendant Virgilio Sarmiento was personal. The trial court's decision explicitly ordered them to "personally to pay the salaries which the plaintiffs failed to receive by reason of their illegal removal from office until they are actually reinstated." The Court of Appeals affirmed this, ruling that the defendants were "personally liable jointly and severally because they acted without justifiable cause." On the issue of whether the petitioner, having ceased to be the municipal mayor, is still personally liable for the back salaries of the illegally removed policemen: The Court found that the petitioner remained personally liable. The jurisprudence relied upon by the petitioner to shift responsibility to the Municipality of Norzagaray, specifically Aguador v. Enerio and Sison v. Pajo, were found inapplicable. In those cases, the judgments either specifically directed the municipality to pay or the officers were made parties in their official capacity, implying municipal liability. In the present case, the judgment explicitly found petitioner Correa and his co-defendant personally liable. The Court reiterated the principle established in Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, stating that a municipal mayor adjudged liable for back salaries due to wrongful dismissal without justifiable cause cannot hide under the mantle of his official capacity and pass the liability to the municipality. The Court emphasized that a public officer who commits a wrongful act beyond the scope of their duty is personally liable, and this principle applies to wrongful removals from office where legal requirements are not met. Therefore, the petitioner's cessation from office did not extinguish his personal liability as determined by a final and executory judgment.
Main Doctrine
A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable therefor like any private individual. This principle applies when a public officer wrongfully removes another officer or discharges an employee without complying with legal requirements, rendering the officer personally liable for back salaries.