Republic v. Polo
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the Republic of the Philippines' attempt to appeal a land registration case. The Court of First Instance of Samar granted the application of Basilio Rosales and others for the registration of thirteen lots totaling approximately seven hectares in Barangay Malahug, Tinambacan, Calbayog City. 2. Procedural History: The Solicitor General's Office received a copy of the decision on May 25, 1978. A motion for reconsideration was filed on June 23, 1978, twenty-nine days after service. The order denying this motion was received on August 18, 1978. On the same date, a notice of appeal and a motion for a thirty-day extension to file the record on appeal were filed. The record on appeal was subsequently filed on September 15, 1978. The lower court disapproved the appeal, deeming the record on appeal filed out of time, calculating the thirty-day period from May 11, 1978 (when the city fiscal was served) instead of May 25, 1978 (when the Solicitor General's Office was served). 3. The Petition: The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a petition for review, treated as a mandamus action, to compel the lower court to give due course to its appeal. The core issue is whether the thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the service of the decision upon the city fiscal or upon the Solicitor General. The petition argues that service on the city fiscal did not constitute service on the Solicitor General, citing the Solicitor General's explicit request for separate service in Manila and his retained supervision and control over the case, as well as a relevant circular from the Secretary of Justice.
Issue(s)
Whether the thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the service of the decision upon the city fiscal or from the time it was served upon the Solicitor General. Whether the Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration, filed on the twenty-ninth day, interrupted the period for appeal despite alleged late service on the adverse party.
Ruling
The Court held that the appeal was perfected seasonably. The order disallowing the petitioner's appeal is reversed and set aside, and the trial court is directed to give due course to the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the reckoning of the appeal period: The thirty-day period for appeal should be counted from the date when the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision. Service of the decision upon the city fiscal did not operate as service upon the Solicitor General. Although the Solicitor General requested the city fiscal to represent him, he made his own separate appearance and expressly requested that all notices, orders, resolutions, and decisions be served upon him in Manila. This service was explicitly stated to be distinct from service on the city fiscal. Furthermore, a Circular of the Secretary of Justice advised provincial and city fiscals that in cases where they represent the Solicitor General, service on the Solicitor General shall be the basis for the purpose of the finality of the decision. The ruling in Republic vs. Reyes is not applicable here because in that case, the fiscal was authorized to file pleadings for the Government, whereas in this case, the city fiscal's authority was confined to attending hearings, and the Office of the Solicitor General filed the pleadings and motions. On the interruption of the appeal period by the motion for reconsideration: The private respondents' contention that the motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the period for appeal because it was served three days after the expiration of the period is not given full weight. While the service was late, the tardiness is more apparent than real. If the Solicitor General's office had sent the motion by registered mail on June 23, 1978, it would likely have reached the private respondents after June 27, 1978, when they were personally served. In the interest of justice, the Court may except a particular case from the operation of its rules, and the delay in service, in this instance, did not prejudice the adverse party's right to be heard.
Main Doctrine
The thirty-day period for appeal in land registration cases should be counted from the date the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision, not from the date it was served upon the city fiscal, even if the fiscal was requested to represent the Solicitor General, especially when the Solicitor General made a separate appearance and expressly requested separate service.