Vivo v. Reyes
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Commissioner of Immigration sought to restrain the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila from enjoining the deportation of aliens Tan Sio Wan and her minor children, Tiu Yek Hiong and Tiu Chi Lu, who were the wife and children of Tiu To Kiat, a naturalized Filipino citizen. The aliens arrived as temporary visitors and were granted extensions, but were ordered to leave the country. Instead of complying, they filed a prohibition case with the CFI to stop their deportation. Procedural History: The prohibition case was based on Tiu To Kiat's granted petition for naturalization, which had become final. The CFI, in its decision dated April 18, 1963, held that Tiu To Kiat's naturalization made his wife and children Filipino citizens, thus they could not be deported. The CFI ordered the cancellation of their immigration papers and the refund of their cash bond. This decision became final and executory on May 20, 1963. The Petition: Approximately ten months after the entry of judgment, the Commissioner of Immigration filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court to prevent the implementation of the CFI's decision. A preliminary injunction was issued by the Supreme Court. The respondents argued that certiorari and prohibition were not the proper remedies, as appeal was available and had been lost. Subsequently, Tiu To Kiat's naturalization was cancelled by the Supreme Court in a decision dated March 25, 1974, due to failure to meet educational requirements. However, Tiu To Kiat was later granted Philippine citizenship under Presidential Decree No. 1055.
Issue(s)
Whether certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to assail a final and executory judgment of the lower court. Whether supervening events, such as the denaturalization of the husband and father and the subsequent grant of citizenship, can render a final and executory decision void and subject to collateral attack.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed, and the preliminary injunction issued is dissolved. The Supreme Court held that certiorari and prohibition cannot be a substitute for appeal, especially when the judgment sought to be assailed has already become final and executory. The Court found that the lower court had jurisdiction to render the decision in question, and the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are explicitly available only when there is no appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari and prohibition: The Supreme Court reiterated the fundamental principle that certiorari and prohibition are extraordinary remedies that are only available when there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) had become final and executory. The Commissioner of Immigration had the remedy of appeal from the CFI's decision but failed to avail himself of it within the reglementary period. Therefore, resorting to certiorari and prohibition approximately ten months after the entry of judgment was an improper use of these remedies, as they cannot be used to circumvent the loss of the right to appeal. The Court emphasized that after a judgment becomes final and executory, the ordinary remedies are no longer available, and extraordinary remedies cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The Court cited Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to support this contention. The Court also noted that the Commissioner's petition was filed about ten months after the entry of judgment, which further militated against its being considered a speedy and adequate remedy. On the effect of supervening events: The Supreme Court stated that whether supervening events, such as the denaturalization of Tiu To Kiat and the subsequent grant of Philippine citizenship to him, would render the execution of the CFI's judgment impossible, unjust, or inequitable, was a point that need not be decided in the present case. The Court's primary focus was on the procedural impropriety of using certiorari and prohibition to assail a final and executory judgment. The Court alluded to the principle that immigration cases affect the sovereignty of the State, suggesting that such matters might require different considerations, but ultimately declined to rule on the merits of the supervening events in the context of the available remedies. The Court's decision in Tiu To Kiat vs. Republic (L-28169, March 25, 1974), which cancelled Tiu To Kiat's naturalization, was acknowledged as having removed the basis for the CFI's prohibition order. However, the subsequent grant of citizenship under PD 1055 further complicated the situation, but the Court did not delve into these complexities due to the procedural bar.
Main Doctrine
Certiorari and prohibition cannot be availed of to circumvent the remedy of appeal when a judgment has already become final and executory, as these remedies are only available when there is no appeal. Supervening events that render the execution of a judgment impossible, unjust, or inequitable do not automatically render a final and executory decision void and subject to collateral attack via certiorari and prohibition.