Torralba v. De Los Angeles
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a conditional contract to sell a parcel of land between the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) and Romana T. Torralba. Torralba failed to make timely payments after an initial down payment and subsequent installments, leading to the cancellation of the contract by PHHC. PHHC subsequently filed an action for recovery of possession, which resulted in a default judgment against Torralba. 2. Procedural History: Following the default judgment in Civil Case No. Q-3548, PHHC sought execution. While an execution was issued, its enforcement was deferred due to Torralba's representations. Years later, PHHC awarded the disputed land to Florencia San Juan, executed a deed of sale, and obtained a new title. PHHC then filed a motion for an order of demolition to enforce the original judgment. The respondent Judge granted this motion, leading to the premises being turned over to San Juan. Torralba then filed a motion for a restraining order and reconsideration, which was denied, prompting the instant petition. 3. The Petition: This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition seeking to annul the order of demolition. Torralba argues that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the demolition order because the judgment, rendered on October 28, 1959, could no longer be enforced by motion, as more than five years had elapsed since it became final and executory on December 5, 1959, invoking Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Torralba also contends that her payment of P1,000.00 to PHHC should have revived the contract and that PHHC should have initiated a new action to rescind the contract before awarding it to San Juan.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order of demolition. Whether the decision in Civil Case No. Q-3548 could be enforced by a mere motion after the lapse of more than five (5) years from its promulgation. Whether the petitioner's payment of P1,000.00 to PHHC revived the conditional contract to sell. Whether PHHC should have resorted to a judicial decree rescinding the contract before awarding the lot to Florencia San Juan.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction is lifted and set aside. Costs are against the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
The Court did not explicitly address whether the Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order of demolition. However, the subsequent rulings on the enforceability of the judgment and the rescission of the contract imply that the demolition order was a consequence of valid legal processes. On the enforceability of the judgment by motion: The Court held that while Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment can only be enforced by motion within five years from its entry or finality, the running of this period can be interrupted. In this case, the judgment became final and executory on December 5, 1959. PHHC filed a motion for execution on March 16, 1960, within the five-year period. Although the ejectment was not carried out due to the petitioner's representations to PHHC to withhold execution due to financial difficulties, this agreement to defer or suspend the enforcement of the judgment interrupts the period of limitations prescribed. The subsequent motion for demolition on March 21, 1967, was filed after the lapse of seven years, three months, and seventeen days from the judgment's finality. However, the interruption caused by the initial motion for execution and the subsequent agreement to suspend enforcement meant that the five-year period had not fully expired when the PHHC sought to enforce the judgment again. The Court cited Lancita vs. Magbanua and MRR vs. CIR in support of the principle that agreements to defer judgment enforcement interrupt the prescriptive period. On the revival of the contract to sell: The Court found no merit in the petitioner's claim that her payment of P1,000.00 revived the contract. Clause 12 of the contract stipulated that revival after cancellation for non-payment could occur by paying in cash all installments and interests due within ninety (90) days after the contract was cancelled and declared forfeited. The contract was cancelled on July 11, 1952. The petitioner's deposit of P1,000.00 was made on November 23, 1960, long after the 90-day period had expired. Furthermore, the amount deposited was less than the credit due to PHHC, and it was made after a judgment had already been rendered against the petitioner, suggesting it was intended as partial satisfaction of the judgment rather than a revival of the contract. The requirements for revival were not met. On the necessity of a judicial decree for rescission: The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that PHHC should have obtained a judicial decree to rescind the contract before awarding the lot to Florencia San Juan. The contract expressly provided that it would be deemed annulled and cancelled, and PHHC would be at liberty to re-possess and dispose of the property upon the petitioner's default in paying installments. Therefore, from the moment of default, the contract was considered ipso facto rescinded by operation of law, and no judicial decree was necessary to effectuate the rescission.
Main Doctrine
The running of the five-year period for the execution of a judgment by motion is interrupted by the filing of a motion for execution and by the agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the enforcement of the judgment.