Decano v. Edu
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Federico Decano was issued a temporary appointment as janitor in the Motor Vehicles Office, Dagupan City Agency, on September 12, 1962. He served for almost four years until April 29, 1966, when he received a telegram from Romeo F. Edu, Acting Commissioner of the Land Transportation Commission (LTC), terminating his services. Procedural History: Decano filed a petition for Mandamus and Injunction before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, seeking to declare the order of removal null and void, to be reinstated, and to receive his salary. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction. Although agreeing that Decano's appointment was temporary and could be terminated without cause, the lower court declared the removal null and void because respondent Edu was not the appointing authority and thus lacked the power to remove. The Petition: The respondents appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over respondent Edu, whose official station was in Quezon City.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan has jurisdiction over the petition for Mandamus and Injunction despite the official station of respondent Romeo F. Edu being in Quezon City. Whether the termination of petitioner Federico Decano's services was valid, considering that respondent Romeo F. Edu was not the appointing authority for the position of janitor.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, upholding its jurisdiction and declaring the order of removal null and void.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction: The Court held that the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan has jurisdiction. While the primary relief sought was the annulment of the dismissal order issued by respondent Edu, who was stationed in Quezon City, the injunction sought was to restrain the implementation of this order by his subordinate officer, respondent Cipriano Posadas, whose official station was in Dagupan City, within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction. The Court reiterated the principle that the power of judicial review of administrative decisions is not confined to the courts of the locality where the national officials' offices are maintained, but extends to the courts in the localities where the aggrieved parties reside and where the questioned decisions are sought to be enforced. This ensures access to justice for litigants of limited means and avoids overburdening the Manila courts. The Court cited Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen, et al. and Gonzales vs. Secretary of Public Works, et al. to support this stance, emphasizing that where the acts to be restrained are performed within the territorial boundaries of a judicial district, the court of first instance of that district has jurisdiction, even if some respondents are stationed elsewhere. The joinder of respondent Edu was for a complete determination of the issues, particularly the legality of his dismissal order, not solely for injunction purposes. On the validity of the termination: The Court affirmed the lower court's finding that while petitioner Decano's appointment was temporary and he could be removed without cause, the removal was effected by the wrong official. The power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. Under Section 79(d) of the Revised Administrative Code, the department head, upon recommendation of the chief of the bureau or office concerned, had the power to appoint and remove subordinate employees whose appointment was not expressly vested in the President. In this case, Decano's temporary appointment was issued by the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications upon recommendation of the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office. Republic Act No. 4136, which created the Land Transportation Commission, did not vest the Commissioner with the power to appoint or remove employees; the commission remained under the Department of Public Works and Communications. Therefore, the power to appoint and, consequently, the power to remove, remained with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Respondent Edu, as Acting Commissioner, was not the appointing authority and thus had no power to remove Decano. His termination of Decano's services was without authority and therefore null and void. The Court also dismissed the technicality regarding the verification of the petition, finding substantial compliance and noting that the issue was purely one of law with undisputed facts.
Main Doctrine
The power of judicial review of administrative decisions of national officials is not confined to the courts of first instance of Metropolitan Manila where their offices are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the aggrieved parties reside and the questioned decisions are sought to be enforced. Furthermore, the power to remove an employee is inherent in the power to appoint, and thus, an official who does not have the power to appoint also does not have the power to remove.