Dayao v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd.
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from an ejectment case filed by Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. (Shell) against Jesus Dayao. Shell, as the lessee of a parcel of land, had sub-leased it to Dayao, along with a gasoline service station and its equipment, for an indefinite period terminable upon ninety days' written notice. Shell alleged that Dayao failed to vacate the premises after receiving such notice. Dayao, however, contended that the sub-lease agreement stipulated termination only upon violation of its terms, which he denied, and claimed the ejectment was motivated by his failure to meet gasoline purchase quotas, causing him significant investment loss. 2. Procedural History: Shell initially filed an ejectment complaint against Dayao before the City Court of Quezon City. After trial, the City Court dismissed Shell's complaint, finding no justifiable cause for ejectment. Shell appealed this decision to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. Before the Court of First Instance, Shell filed an Amended Complaint and a Motion for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction to regain possession. Dayao opposed these motions. The respondent Judge admitted the Amended Complaint and issued the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, conditioned upon Shell posting a bond. Dayao's subsequent motions for reconsideration and to dissolve the injunction were denied. This led to the filing of the present special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. 3. The Petition: This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the orders of the respondent Judge admitting Shell's Amended Complaint and issuing a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Petitioner Dayao argues that the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction by allowing Shell to amend its complaint on appeal, introducing new causes of action not raised in the original complaint, and by issuing a preliminary mandatory injunction in an unlawful detainer case, which he contends is only permissible in forcible entry cases. Dayao asserts that these actions constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in admitting SHELL's Amended Complaint on appeal. Whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction to deprive petitioner of his possession of the Shell Service Station.
Ruling
The petition is denied and the case is remanded to the respondent Court for determination of the appeal on the merits and rendition of the corresponding judgment.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of admitting the Amended Complaint: The Court held that the respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in admitting the Amended Complaint. Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court allows amendments to conform to evidence presented, even after judgment, if the issues were tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. In this case, the City Court's decision itself showed that SHELL presented evidence of Dayao's alleged violations, and Dayao, despite objecting, presented counter-evidence. This indicated consent to try the issues of contract violations. The amendments were made to conform the pleadings to the evidence already presented before the City Court, and since the appeal involved a trial de novo, the introduction of these issues on appeal did not constitute a change of theory or cause unfairness to the petitioner. Furthermore, Article 1673 of the Civil Code allows a lessor to judicially eject a lessee for violation of contract terms, and a lessor need not file a separate rescission action but can seek ejection simultaneously in an illegal detainer case. Thus, adding instances of contract violation in the amended complaint was merely an amplification of the ejectment action. On the issue of issuing the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction: The Court ruled that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction was proper. The petitioner argued that such a writ is only for forcible entry cases, not unlawful detainer. However, the Court agreed with SHELL that the applicable provisions were Section 9 of Rule 70 and Article 1674 of the Civil Code, which specifically address the issuance of such writs in ejectment cases on appeal when the lessor's appeal is prima facie meritorious. Article 1674 was enacted to prevent lessees from unjustly continuing possession during an appeal and allows for execution before final judgment. The respondent Judge found SHELL's appeal to be prima facie meritorious, acting within the purview of Article 1674. Any error in judgment could be offset by the bond posted by SHELL to answer for damages that Dayao might suffer if it were finally decided that SHELL was not entitled to the injunction.
Main Doctrine
Amendments to pleadings to conform to evidence presented, even if issues not originally raised, may be allowed at any time, even after judgment, provided the parties consented to the trial of such issues. In ejectment cases on appeal, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction may be issued to restore the lessor in possession if the lessor's appeal is prima facie meritorious, pursuant to Article 1674 of the Civil Code and Section 9 of Rule 70.