Avendaño v. Employees' Compensation Commission
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Marta D. Avendaño was employed as a statistical clerk by the Philippine National Railways since October 15, 1940. On December 5, 1969, she underwent a radical mastectomy, right, and was diagnosed with "carcinoma of the breast with metastasis to the spine and skull." On February 7, 1975, she was hospitalized again due to pain in the lumbar areas and weakness of her lower extremities, with X-ray results showing osteolytic lesion (metastatic). She retired on June 1, 1976, after 36 years of service. Procedural History: On October 13, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability income benefits with the GSIS, which was denied on the ground that her ailment was not an occupational disease and she failed to prove that it was directly caused by her employment or that the risk of contracting it was increased by her working conditions, citing Article 165[l] of Presidential Decree 626 and Section 1[b], Rule III of the Rules on Employees' Compensation. Her motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) sustained the GSIS order on appeal. The Petition: Petitioner sought a review of the ECC's decision before the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the claim for compensation is governed by the Workmen's Compensation Act or Presidential Decree 626 (New Labor Code). Whether the petitioner's illness is compensable under the applicable law. Whether the respondent Commission erred in dismissing the claim despite the presumption of compensability.
Ruling
The decision of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is hereby set aside. The Philippine National Railways is directed to pay the petitioner the sum of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as permanent total disability benefits and to reimburse petitioner her expenses for medical, surgical, and hospital services duly supported by proper receipts.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the claim is governed by the Workmen's Compensation Act or the New Labor Code: The Court held that when an illness subject of a claim supervened in the course of employment prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act shall govern. Although the petitioner filed her claim after the New Labor Code's effectivity, her right accrued in 1969 when she was first diagnosed with cancer. This vested right falls under the protective mantle of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The repeal of a statute does not impair rights vested or accrued while the statute was in force. Therefore, the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, applies to this case. On the compensability of the petitioner's illness: The Court found that it is undisputed that the petitioner was found to be physically and mentally healthy when she entered government service, and her illness, cancer of the breast, supervened in the course of her employment. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, once it is established that an illness supervened during employment, there exists a rebuttable presumption that such illness arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by it. The employer bears the burden of establishing the contrary by substantial evidence. On whether the respondent Commission erred in dismissing the claim: The Court ruled that the respondent Commission erred in dismissing the claim. The conclusion of the ECC's medical officer that the disease was not compensable because it was not directly caused by her occupation or that the risk was not increased by working conditions was not sufficiently borne out by medical findings. Mere medical opinions without substantial proof are insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption of compensability. The respondent Commission cannot rely on probabilities or suppositions. In cases of doubt, the law, being social legislation, must be liberally construed in favor of the claimant.
Main Doctrine
The repeal of a statute does not operate to impair or otherwise affect rights which have been vested or accrued while the statute was in force. Thus, claims accruing under the Workmen's Compensation Act, even if filed after the effectivity of the New Labor Code, are governed by the former.