Turqueza v. Hernando
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Emma and Leo Turqueza filed an action for recovery of damages against CDCP Mining Corporation and respondent Marina Elvena-Pacapac. The case stemmed from an accident on October 20, 1972, where Emma Turqueza sustained serious injuries, including broken pelvic bones and lower limbs, rendering her lame and crippled for life. The accident involved a vehicle owned by CDCP Mining Corporation and a jeep owned and operated by respondent Marina Elvena-Pacapac. Procedural History: Respondent Marina Elvena-Pacapac failed to appear at the pre-trial despite due notice, leading to her being declared in default by the respondent judge. Petitioners were allowed to present their evidence, and the respondent judge rendered a decision awarding P56,000.00 in damages, attorney's fees, and expenses to petitioner Emma Turqueza. No appeal was filed, and the judgment became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued and enforced through the public auction sale of respondent's twelve parcels of ricelands for P56,000.00. The Petition: The controversy arose when the respondent judge issued a "special order" on November 6, 1978, granting respondent's belated "Motion to Reopen Case" dated October 16, 1978. This motion sought to set aside the final and executed judgment on the ground that the default judgment was due to the negligence of her lawyer. The respondent judge's order allowed the respondent to present her evidence despite the judgment being final and executed. The respondent judge denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, prompting the instant petition for certiorari to restrain the respondent judge from further hearing the case and to declare it terminated.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the "special order" to reopen a final and executory judgment. Whether the respondent's motion to reopen the case was filed within the reglementary period for a petition for relief from judgment. Whether the respondent judge had the authority to set aside a final and executed judgment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the questioned "special order" of November 6, 1978, and the order of January 9, 1979, declaring Civil Case No. 1066 terminated and closed. The temporary restraining order issued was made permanent.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of reopening a final and executory judgment: The Court held that there is no justification in law and in fact for the respondent judge's void act of ordering the reopening of the case which had long become final and had in fact been executed. It is a settled principle that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend, much less revoke it. Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time, and the interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. The respondent judge's order was a clear transgression of this fundamental doctrine. On the timeliness of the motion to reopen: The Court found that the motion to reopen the case, filed on October 16, 1978, was in effect a second petition for relief from judgment and was filed out of time. It was filed eleven (11) months and five (5) days after the petitioners learned of the judgment and seven (7) months and twenty-one (21) days after the entry of judgment. This far exceeded the reglementary period under Rule 38, which allows a petition for relief within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment and six (6) months from entry of judgment. Consequently, the respondent judge had lost all authority and jurisdiction to act on the same. On the authority of the respondent judge: The Court emphasized that the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice. While Rule 38 provides an exception or "last chance" through a timely petition for relief from judgment, this grace period is absolutely fixed, inextendible, and cannot be subjected to any condition or contingency. The respondent judge's failure to apply the plain provisions of the Rules and the basic doctrine of finality of judgments, especially since the respondent had already been given a conditional chance to present her evidence which she failed to fully avail of, rendered his subsequent order void. The matter of respondent not being entitled to such relief had also become res judicata with the respondent judge's unappealed order of January 20, 1978.
Main Doctrine
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend, much less revoke it. A motion to reopen a case after a judgment has become final and executory, which is in effect a second petition for relief from judgment, cannot be entertained if filed out of time.