Base v. Leviste
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioners Herminigildo Base and Paquita Fuentes were awarded a lease for Market Stall No. 10 in the Public Market of Pontevedra, Capiz, on September 16, 1958. In 1961, they allowed respondent Gregorio Duno to occupy the stall due to Paquita Fuentes's health. When Duno refused to vacate after a written demand on June 10, 1972, the petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case. The Municipal Court ruled in favor of the petitioners on October 1, 1976, ordering Duno to vacate the stall, restore possession, and pay P17.00 monthly in rentals until possession was returned. 2. Procedural History: Respondent Duno appealed the Municipal Court's decision to the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Branch II (Civil Case No. V-4137). While the appeal was pending, the petitioners filed a motion for immediate execution of the Municipal Court's judgment on April 24, 1979, citing Duno's failure to pay the stipulated monthly rentals from October 1976 to April 1979. Duno opposed this motion, claiming he had delivered postal money orders covering the rental payments. The respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate execution on July 3, 1979, and subsequently denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration on August 27, 1979. 3. The Petition: The petitioners, Herminigildo Base and Paquita Fuentes, filed this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul the orders of July 3, 1979, and August 27, 1979. They argue that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in denying the motion for immediate execution, contending that under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, immediate execution is mandatory when a defendant in an ejectment case fails to pay the monthly rentals during the pendency of the appeal. The core issue is whether the respondent Judge had discretion to deny execution despite the non-payment of rentals.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in denying the motion for immediate execution of the Municipal Court's judgment pending appeal, notwithstanding the respondent's failure to pay the monthly rentals as adjudged. Whether the respondent Judge correctly exercised his discretion in denying the motion for immediate execution.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari and mandamus is granted. The orders dated July 3, 1979, and August 27, 1979, of the respondent Judge are set aside. The respondent Judge is directed to issue an order for the execution of the judgment for the restoration of possession of the premises to the petitioners, without prejudice to the appeal taking its course. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in denying the motion for immediate execution of the Municipal Court's judgment pending appeal, notwithstanding the respondent's failure to pay the monthly rentals as adjudged: The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' contention was well-taken. Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court mandates immediate execution of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment case, unless the defendant perfects an appeal and files a sufficient bond, and during the pendency of the appeal, deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time as found by the Municipal Court. The Court emphasized that if the defendant fails to make the monthly deposit of current rentals, it is mandatory for the Court of First Instance to order the execution of the appealed judgment, and its duty to do so is ministerial and imperative. The respondent's claim of delivering postal money orders after the motion for execution was filed was deemed unavailing, as mere delay in payment, unless excused by mistake, accident, or fraud, renders the court's function to execute the judgment ministerial and imperative. The appellate court has no power to extend the time for making monthly deposits or to excuse defaults therein. Therefore, the respondent Judge should have ordered immediate execution instead of denying it, and in refusing to do so, was guilty of an evasion of a positive duty and acted with grave abuse of discretion. On the issue of whether the respondent Judge correctly exercised his discretion in denying the motion for immediate execution: The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Judge could not exercise discretion in denying the motion for execution. The Court reiterated its consistent holding that the payment of monthly rentals is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with by the courts if execution is to be stayed. When fixed monthly rentals are not paid or deposited, the duty of the court to order the appealed decision executed is ministerial and imperative. The private respondent failed to comply with the condition of paying or depositing the monthly rentals, which is essential for the stay of execution of the judgment against him. Consequently, the respondent Judge's orders were issued in grave abuse of discretion.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court reiterated that in ejectment cases, immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal is mandatory when the defendant fails to pay the monthly rentals as adjudged by the Municipal Court. The Court emphasized that the duty of the Court of First Instance to order execution in such circumstances is ministerial and imperative, and judicial discretion cannot be exercised to deny a motion for execution when the conditions for staying execution have not been met.