Contreras v. Villaraza
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case originates from a forcible entry lawsuit, Civil Case No. 5184, filed in the City Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The underlying dispute concerns two parcels of land, and the city court, in exercising its enlarged jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 5967, adjudicated not only the issue of possession but also the issue of ownership. 2. Procedural History: Defendant Rodrigo Contreras received the city court's decision on November 9, 1979. He filed a notice of appeal, a cash appeal bond, and a motion for an extension to post a supersedeas bond on December 10, 1979, which was the 31st day after service of the decision (the 30th day being a Sunday). On December 11, 1979, he filed a supposed supersedeas bond. The city court, on December 12, 1979, denied due course to the appeal, citing the fifteen-day reglementary period under Section 2, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. A motion for reconsideration was denied on December 27, 1979, and a writ of execution had already been issued on December 3, 1979. 3. The Petition: Contreras filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus on March 14, 1980, after filing a manifestation on January 11, 1980, stating his intention to file in this Court. The petition argues that the city court erred in applying the fifteen-day appeal period under Rule 40. Instead, it contends that the thirty-day period under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court should apply, as the city court decided the issue of ownership, making the case directly appealable to the Court of Appeals under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5967.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for certiorari and mandamus was seasonably filed. Whether the city court erred in holding that the appeal should be perfected within fifteen days from notice of the decision.
Ruling
The petition for mandamus was seasonably filed. The city court erred in holding that the appeal should be perfected within fifteen days from notice of the decision. The order of December 12, 1979, is reversed and set aside, and the city court is directed to pass upon the sufficiency of the petitioner's record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal if no other legal ground exists for its disallowance. The city court is also directed to ascertain the adequacy and propriety of the petitioner's alleged supersedeas bond in light of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the petition: The Court held that the petition for mandamus was seasonably filed. Section 15, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that when a motion to dismiss an appeal is erroneously granted or a record on appeal is disallowed by the trial court, a petition for mandamus may be filed in the appellate court. Neither Section 15 of Rule 41 nor Rule 65 of the Rules of Court specifies a period for filing such a petition. Therefore, it may be filed within a reasonable time, provided the petitioner is not guilty of laches. The Court cited Centenera vs. Yatco, Province of Misamis Occidental vs. Catolico, and Cortes vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz to support this principle. The petition filed on March 14, 1980, after the city court's order of December 12, 1979, and the denial of reconsideration on December 27, 1979, was considered within a reasonable time, especially considering the petitioner's manifestation on January 11, 1980, of his intent to file a petition for certiorari. On the reglementary period for appeal: The Court held that the city court erred in applying the fifteen-day reglementary period under Section 2, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. This rule applies to appeals from judgments of inferior courts in cases falling within their exclusive original jurisdiction. However, in this case, the city court had resolved the issue of ownership in conjunction with the ejectment suit, thereby exercising its enlarged jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Court of First Instance, as provided by Republic Act No. 5967. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5967 explicitly states that decisions in such cases are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, in accordance with the Rules of Court applicable to appeals from judgments of the Court of First Instance. Consequently, the thirty-day period provided in Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which governs appeals from judgments of the Court of First Instance, is the applicable period for perfecting the appeal. The Court cited Pelaez vs. Reyes in support of this interpretation.
Main Doctrine
In ejectment cases where the city court has resolved the issue of ownership under its enlarged jurisdiction, the appeal is governed by the Rules of Court applicable to appeals from the Court of First Instance, which provides a thirty-day period for perfection, not the fifteen-day period for ordinary ejectment suits.