Pharma Industries, Inc. v. Honorable Meliton Pajarillaga
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Pharma Industries, Inc. (petitioner) filed an ejectment case against Sergia A. del Rosario (private respondent) concerning a piece of land. The dispute arose from a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed on November 12, 1977, where the respondent had the right to repurchase the land until November 12, 1978. Upon failure to repurchase, the petitioner initiated proceedings for consolidation of ownership, which resulted in a decision declaring the petitioner as the full owner. Subsequently, the petitioner demanded that the respondent vacate the premises, which the respondent refused. Procedural History: The City Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch II, dismissed the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the action should have been filed with the Court of First Instance as it involved recovery of possession (accion publiciana). A motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to the present petition for certiorari. The Petition: The petitioner seeks to annul the dismissal order and compel the respondent judge to take cognizance of the case and resolve the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Issue(s)
Whether the City Court has jurisdiction over an ejectment case filed by a vendee a retro against a vendor a retro who failed to repurchase the property and refused to vacate, and whether the action filed is one for unlawful detainer or accion publiciana.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The respondent judge is ordered to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 8126 and resolve the petitioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The dismissal of the case is set aside.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction of the City Court over an ejectment case and the classification of the action: The Supreme Court held that the proper remedy is ejectment under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, specifically unlawful detainer, and not accion publiciana. The Court clarified that the summary action for ejectment is for the recovery of physical possession and can be filed within one year after unlawful deprivation or withholding. It encompasses two distinct causes of action: forcible entry, where possession is illegal ab initio, and unlawful detainer, where possession was initially lawful but became unlawful due to the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession. In this case, the respondent's possession became unlawful after she failed to repurchase the property and refused to vacate upon demand, making it a clear instance of unlawful detainer. The Court emphasized that for unlawful detainer, it is sufficient to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession, and prior possession by the plaintiff is not always a prerequisite, especially when a vendee seeks possession from a vendor whose right has ceased. The Court found that the present case squarely falls under unlawful detainer because Sergia A. del Rosario, the vendor a retro, failed to repurchase the property within the agreed period. After the consolidation of title in favor of the vendee a retro (Pharma Industries, Inc.), her right to possess the property ceased to be lawful. The demand to vacate was made on June 13, 1979, and the ejectment suit was filed on October 22, 1979, which is well within the one-year period prescribed for such actions. The respondent judge erred in believing the action was forcible entry, which requires allegations of prior possession and forcible deprivation. The Court cited Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court to support the proposition that for unlawful detainer, alleging unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient. The Court explained that Pharma Industries, Inc. acquired possession through proper acts and legal formalities when Sergia A. del Rosario executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase on November 12, 1977. Possession was further confirmed upon the respondent's failure to repurchase the property, leading to the consolidation of the vendee's title. The Court referenced Article 531 of the Civil Code, which defines possession as acquired by material occupation or the exercise of a right, or by acts and legal formalities. It also cited Tolentino's commentary, which includes contracts like sale with right to repurchase and judicial possession as examples of acquiring possession through proper acts and formalities. Therefore, the petitioner had prior possession in the legal sense before filing the unlawful detainer suit.
Main Doctrine
A summary action for ejectment under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, specifically unlawful detainer, is the proper remedy when a vendor fails to repurchase a property within the stipulated period, and subsequently refuses to vacate the premises upon demand after the vendee's title has been consolidated. Such an action does not require prior possession by the plaintiff if the defendant's possession became unlawful due to the expiration of their right to possess.