Surigao v. Cachero
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Complainant Virgilio Surigao, doing business as Surigao Motor Works, filed an administrative charge against respondent Marino V. Cachero, Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City. The charge alleged that the respondent acted illegally and with abuse of authority in implementing a writ of execution. Procedural History: The complaint was referred to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for investigation and report. The Executive Judge submitted a report and recommendation. The Court of Appeals had reiterated the enforcement of the writ on December 13, 1979, after the complainant had filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed. The levy was made on December 14, 1979. The Petition: The core of the complaint revolved around the alleged illegal implementation of the writ of execution, specifically concerning the expiration of the sixty-day period for enforcement, the entry into the premises without a court order, and the demolition of the motor shop.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Sheriff acted illegally and with abuse of authority in implementing the writ of execution, considering the authorization from the Court of Appeals. Whether the sixty-day period for enforcing the writ had expired, considering the delays caused by the complainant. Whether the Sheriff's entry into the premises without a court order was lawful, specifically addressing the authorization from the Court of Appeals. Whether the demolition of the motor shop was conducted illegally, considering the treatment of the constructions as chattels and the lack of evidence supporting Surigao's claim on major repairs.
Ruling
The Court resolved to DISMISS the case against Deputy Sheriff Marino Cachero, with an admonition to act more strictly in conformity with the rules henceforth. The Court found the respondent's actuations to be substantially in accordance with the pertinent rules, even if not literally adhering thereto.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Sheriff's actions and abuse of authority: The Court found the respondent's defense tenable regarding entry to the premises. The respondent claimed authorization from a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 1, 1979, which authorized the sheriff to break open the premises. Therefore, the entry was deemed lawful based on the appellate court's directive. The Court also observed that the constructions were levied upon as chattels by the Sheriff. Subsequently, these were sold to the judgment creditor, who then caused the demolition. By the time of the demolition, the title to the improvements had already passed to the judgment creditor. The Court found no necessity to follow the procedure for the sale of real property as the parties did not treat the improvements as real property. On the sixty-day period for enforcement: The Court held that the sixty-day period had not expired. This was due to several motions and petitions filed by the complainant Surigao, which caused delay in the enforcement of the writ. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals itself directed the enforcement on December 13, 1979, and the levy was made on December 14, 1979. The execution was issued pending appeal under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and immediate execution could not be defeated by the defendant's delaying tactics. The Court noted that even if a valid levy is made, the auction sale may be effected beyond the five-year period, citing Del Rosario vs. Yatco. On entry to the premises without a court order: The Court found the respondent's defense tenable. The respondent claimed authorization from a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 1, 1979, which indeed authorized the sheriff to break open the premises in question. Therefore, the entry was deemed lawful based on the appellate court's directive. On the demolition of the motor shop: The Sheriff levied the materials as personal property, and Surigao did not complain about this treatment when the notice of Sheriff's sale described the levied property as chattels. Moreover, the City Court, Court of First Instance, and Court of Appeals found no evidence to support Surigao's claim on major repairs. The Court also noted that Surigao did not declare the premises for tax purposes and did not pay real taxes, and no evidence was presented that the motorshop was a permanent structure. There was also no charge that the Sheriff did not observe the procedure for the sale of real property on execution under Section 18(c) of Rule 39.
Main Doctrine
A sheriff's actuations in implementing a writ of execution, while not strictly adhering to all procedural rules, may be sustained if substantially in accordance with pertinent rules, especially when the delay in enforcement was occasioned by the judgment debtor's own legal maneuvers and when the sheriff acted with the court's implicit or explicit authorization.