People v. Reyes
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An information for qualified theft was filed against Francisco Estrella and three others in the Municipal Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, alleging the offense was committed in August 1964. Procedural History: On November 15, 1969, a new information was filed with the Circuit Criminal Court, charging the same accused with qualified theft, but alleging the offense was committed in August 1969. Francisco Estrella was arraigned on January 28, 1970, pleaded not guilty, and the information was read and translated to him. The prosecution made no move to amend the information at that time. On May 21, 1970, when the prosecution was scheduled to present evidence, it verbally moved to amend the information to change the date of the offense from August 1969 to August 1964. The accused objected, arguing he was prepared to defend himself against the 1969 charge. The respondent Judge denied the verbal motion to amend the information, citing that the amendment would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Petition: The People of the Philippines, through certiorari, questioned the orders of the respondent Judge denying the amendment to the information, alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow an amendment to the information to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense from August 1969 to August 1964, after arraignment and plea; and whether time is a material ingredient of qualified theft. Whether the amendment sought constitutes a change of substance or merely of form, and if it would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused, considering the procedural aspect of the amendment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned orders of the respondent Judge, denied the petition for lack of merit, and dissolved the preliminary injunction.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of amending the information after arraignment and plea, and whether time is a material ingredient of qualified theft: Under Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an information, after arraignment and plea, may be amended only as to matters of form, provided it is done without prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused. The Court held that changing the date of the commission of the offense from August 1969 to August 1964, a period of five years, constitutes a change of substance and not merely of form. Such an amendment would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused, as it violates their constitutional right to be informed of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. The Court reiterated the ruling in People vs. Placido Opemia, et al., where a similar change in dates was deemed unfair and prejudicial to the accused. While it is true that time is generally not a material ingredient of qualified theft, the Court clarified that this does not grant prosecuting officers license to be careless with dates. The prosecution is expected to provide an approximate date, and the accused should not be surprised by evidence of an offense committed on a date significantly remote from the one alleged. In this case, the disparity between 1964 and 1969 is too great to be considered a mere approximation or a matter of form. The accused was prepared to defend against a charge in 1969, and introducing evidence for an offense in 1964 would catch him by surprise and impair his substantial rights. On whether the amendment sought constitutes a change of substance or merely of form, and if it would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused, considering the procedural aspect of the amendment: The prosecution had ample opportunity to discover and rectify the mistake in the information. The mistake was present during the arraignment on January 28, 1970, and the trial was set for May 21, 1970, giving the prosecution over three months to file a formal amendment. The verbal motion to amend was made only at the commencement of the trial, which the Court found to be too late and would undoubtedly surprise and prejudice the accused. Therefore, the respondent Judge's denial of the amendment was a proper exercise of discretion, not constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Main Doctrine
An amendment to an information changing the date of the alleged commission of the offense from a later year to an earlier year, after arraignment and plea, is considered a change of substance that prejudices the substantial rights of the accused, as it violates their constitutional right to be informed of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves.