Nieto v. Angeles
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case originates from intestate estate proceedings concerning the estate of the late Manuel Nieto, Sr. The petitioner, Rene Nieto, was appointed as the Administrator of the estate. A claimant, Balbinita T. Lacson, filed a claim for $61,300.00, representing the return of advance payment for apartments in Madrid, Spain, sold by the deceased, plus interest and attorney's fees. The Administrator initially filed a one-paragraph answer denying the claim as unwarranted and frivolous, stating the estate owed the claimant nothing. 2. Procedural History: Following the Administrator's initial denial, the claimant filed a motion to require an accounting and/or remove the Administrator. Simultaneously, the claimant filed a manifestation seeking to have the Administrator's answer considered an admission of the claim. The Administrator requested a postponement of the hearing due to counsel's illness. The respondent judge denied the postponement, treated the Administrator's answer as an admission, and allowed the claimant to present evidence ex-parte. Subsequently, the judge issued an order approving the claimant's claim. The Administrator filed several motions for reconsideration, which were denied. The Administrator then filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, but the respondent judge dismissed the appeal, deeming the Administrator's motions for reconsideration to be pro-forma and thus not suspending the period to appeal. 3. The Petition: The petitioner, Rene Nieto, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court. The core issue raised is whether his motion for reconsideration dated April 8, 1972, was pro-forma, failing to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, and consequently, whether it suspended the period for appeal. The petitioner argues that the respondent judge erred in dismissing his appeal as untimely filed. The Supreme Court, however, found that the motion for reconsideration was indeed pro-forma because it incorporated by reference previous arguments without specifically pointing out the findings or conclusions of the court's order of April 3, 1972, that were allegedly unsupported by evidence or contrary to law, as required by the Rules of Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 1972, filed by the petitioner, was pro-forma and thus did not suspend the running of the period for appeal. Whether the Notice of Appeal filed on July 7, 1972, was filed out of time.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The order of the respondent court dated April 3, 1972, is affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued is lifted and set aside.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 1972, was pro-forma: The Supreme Court held that the motion was indeed pro-forma. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court requires that a motion for reconsideration must state the grounds therefor and, when based on findings or conclusions not supported by evidence or contrary to law, must point out specifically such findings or conclusions and make express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or provisions of law. The petitioner's motion merely incorporated by reference the grounds alleged in a previous motion dated April 1, 1972, and did not specifically point out the findings or conclusions of the April 3, 1972 order that were allegedly unsupported by evidence or contrary to law. This failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of the Rules of Court rendered the motion pro-forma. The Court reiterated its ruling in Valdez vs. Jugo and subsequent cases, emphasizing that such motions, failing to meet the specificity required, are treated as intended merely to delay proceedings. The incorporation by reference, especially when the order being assailed was not yet in existence at the time of the prior motion, further underscored the deficiency of the April 8, 1972 motion. Therefore, it did not suspend the period for appeal. On the issue of whether the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time: Since the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 1972, was deemed pro-forma, it did not suspend the running of the period to appeal. The order of April 3, 1972, became final and executory on May 9, 1972, which was thirty (30) days after the petitioner's receipt of the order on April 8, 1972. The petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal only on July 7, 1972. Consequently, the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period, making it time-barred. The respondent judge's dismissal of the appeal was therefore well-founded.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration that fails to comply with the specific requirements of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, particularly in failing to point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions, is considered pro-forma and does not suspend the running of the period for appeal.