Buscayno v. Enrile
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the authority of military tribunals to try civilians, specifically Bernabe Buscayno, who was arrested as a ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB), or New People's Army (NPA). He faced charges for violating R.A. No. 1700 and for murder before Military Commission No. 2, and was also an accused in the MV Karagatan case for rebellion before Military Commission No. 1. 2. Procedural History: The case originated with the arrest of petitioner Bernabe Buscayno. His trial before respondent Military Commission No. 2 had commenced prior to his arrest and continued thereafter. On October 25, 1977, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and prohibition was filed. This was followed by an urgent supplemental petition filed on December 3, 1977, reiterating allegations of denial of procedural due process. The respondents submitted a Comment to these petitions, which included a Presidential order dated November 29, 1977, directing a reopening of the trial to receive further arguments and evidence. 3. The Petition: The petition, filed under a writ of habeas corpus and prohibition, challenges the power of military tribunals to try individuals not members of the armed forces. A novel aspect introduced is the argument that respondent Military Commission lost its judicial power on October 17, 1976, when the Filipino people ratified amendments to the Constitution, thereby terminating the authoritarian regime. Petitioner contends that any judgment rendered by the commission would violate Section 9, Article X of the Constitution. The petition also reiterates claims of denial of procedural due process.
Issue(s)
Whether respondent Military Commission lost its power to try petitioner after October 17, 1976, due to the ratification of constitutional amendments. Whether the proceedings before the Military Commission violated petitioner's right to procedural due process. Whether a judgment rendered by a Military Commission would be violative of Article X, Section 9 of the Constitution. Whether the Military Commission was lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear cases against civilians.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The Court found no justification for granting the remedies prayed for.
Ratio Decidendi
On the power of Military Commissions after October 17, 1976: The Court reiterated the ruling in Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission, holding that the power of military tribunals to try civilians remained valid. The Court cited the transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution (Article XVII, Section 3(2)) which declared all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated by the President during the martial law period as part of the law of the land, remaining valid and effective even after the ratification of the Constitution. The argument that the plebiscite terminated the authoritarian regime and divested military commissions of power was deemed without legal support, as the Constitution remained supreme and civilian supremacy was upheld. On the alleged denial of procedural due process: The Court found that the Presidential order dated November 29, 1977, directing the reopening of the trial to receive further arguments, witnesses, and evidence, would have addressed any perceived constitutional infirmity. Furthermore, the Court, referencing Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission, stated that due process does not guarantee a specific form of tribunal. A military tribunal of competent jurisdiction, with proper accusation, notice, opportunity to defend, and an impartial trial, adequately meets the due process requirement. The procedures prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 39 were deemed to assure observance of fundamental requisites of procedural due process, including due notice, a fair and impartial trial, and reasonable opportunity for defense. On the alleged violation of Article X, Section 9 of the Constitution: The Court held that a military commission is not a court of record within the meaning of Article X, Section 9 of the Constitution. Moreover, the procedure followed, including the form of judgment, was given approval in the Aquino decision, citing the applicable section of the Article on Transitory Provisions. The availability of the records of proceedings to reviewing authorities was also noted as a safeguard against arbitrariness. On the lawful constitution and jurisdiction of Military Commissions: Citing Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission, the Court affirmed that respondent Military Commission No. 2 was lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear cases against civilians. This was based on the President's authority under the commander-in-chief clause and the specific General Orders and Presidential Decrees issued during martial law, which were declared part of the law of the land. The Court emphasized that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, possesses broad authority in times of national peril to preserve the Republic's safety and security, including the creation of military tribunals for specific cases.
Main Doctrine
The power of military tribunals to try civilians, even during the period of martial law, was upheld, reiterating previous rulings that such tribunals were lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction. The Court found no merit in the petitioner's claim that the termination of the authoritarian regime divested military commissions of their power, citing constitutional provisions and prior jurisprudence that validated proclamations, orders, and decrees issued during martial law.