Aguila v. Genato
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners are officials of the National Electrification Administration (NEA) and the Misamis Occidental Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MOELCI II). Private respondent Dominador B. Borje was elected Director of MOELCI II for a three-year term starting March 25, 1979. Section 21 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 269 prohibits elective officers of the government, except barrio captains and councilors, from being officers or directors of any cooperative. Section 3, Article IV of MOELCI II's by-laws similarly disqualifies individuals holding elective office above the level of barrio captain from becoming or remaining a Board member. Procedural History: On January 4, 1980, private respondent filed a certificate of candidacy for member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City. NEA issued Memorandum No. 18 stating that officials running for public office would be considered resigned upon winning and assuming office. Private respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 3, 1980, private respondent assumed office as Sangguniang Panglunsod member. On the same date, the respondent Judge issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing private respondent to retain his position as Director of MOELCI II. Petitioners moved to dismiss, which was initially granted by a vacation judge, but the TRO was later revived. On May 10, 1980, the MOELCI II Board declared private respondent's position vacant. On June 6, 1980, the respondent Judge reconsidered and revived the TRO, ruling that as a 'councilor,' private respondent was exempt under Section 21 of PD No. 269. The Petition: Petitioners filed a certiorari petition with the Supreme Court, arguing that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the restraining orders and that Courts of First Instance lack jurisdiction to issue such orders. They contended that private respondent was disqualified by his election to the Sangguniang Panglunsod, citing PD No. 269 and the MOELCI II by-laws. The Supreme Court issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the lower court's order and prohibiting further proceedings.
Issue(s)
Whether respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the restraining orders. Whether private respondent, having been elected as a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod, is disqualified from continuing as a Director of MOELCI II.
Ruling
The Supreme Court found that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the restraining order dated June 6, 1980. The said order was annulled and set aside, and the petition in the lower court was ordered dismissed. The temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court was made permanent.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the various restraining orders, particularly the one dated June 6, 1980. The Court found that the private respondent had not shown a clear and explicit right to the position of Director of MOELCI II, which is a prerequisite for the issuance of a restraining order that partakes of the nature of a mandatory injunction. The issuance of such an order, compelling the retention of a position by someone who has become disqualified, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The Court's own restraining order was made permanent, effectively halting the lower court's proceedings. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court held that private respondent was disqualified from continuing as a Director of MOELCI II by virtue of his election as a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City. This disqualification stemmed from the clear mandate of PD No. 269, which states that elective officials, except 'barrio captains and councilors,' are ineligible to become officers or directors of any cooperative. The Court interpreted the term 'barrio' as modifying both 'captains' and 'councilors,' thus excluding councilors from the exception. Furthermore, the MOELCI II by-laws explicitly prohibited individuals holding elective office above the level of barrio captain from remaining as Board members. The Court clarified that eligibility is a continuing requirement, and the private respondent's election to the Sangguniang Panglunsod rendered him ineligible to continue in his directorship, even if he was qualified at the commencement of his term. The Court also noted that by the time the respondent Judge issued the June 6, 1980 order, the MOELCI II Board had already declared the private respondent's position vacant.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court held that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the restraining orders. The Court emphasized that eligibility for an office is a continuing requirement and must exist throughout the occupancy of the position. By being elected to the Sangguniang Panglunsod, the private respondent became ineligible to continue as a Director of MOELCI II, as the exception for 'barrio captains and councilors' in PD No. 269 was interpreted to modify both positions, and the by-laws explicitly prohibited holding any elective office above the level of barrio captain. Moreover, the Court noted that at the time of the last restraining order, the position was already declared vacant by the cooperative's Board of Directors.