People v. Hernando
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondents Cosme Calibuso, Ernesto Calibuso, and Rey Tubana, along with two others, were charged with Frustrated Murder for stabbing Romeo Dukinal. The prosecution alleged that all acts of execution were performed, but death was prevented by timely medical attendance. Procedural History: The trial court initially found the three private respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt and convicted them of Frustrated Murder. The accused moved for reconsideration, alleging variance between the crime committed and that proven. Subsequently, they filed an Amended Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion for New Trial, presenting affidavits claiming a different person, William Gonzales, committed the stabbing after a quarrel with the victim. The prosecution opposed this, arguing the evidence was not newly discovered and would not alter the judgment. The respondent Judge granted the motion for new trial, allowed the presentation of a witness (Leonico Talingdan) who testified to the same effect, and subsequently issued an Amended Decision acquitting all the accused. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing the amended decision violated due process and that the new trial was improperly granted. The respondent Judge denied reconsideration, citing the doctrine of double jeopardy. The Petition: The People of the Philippines filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the Amended Decision and the Orders denying reconsideration, alleging deprivation of due process and grave abuse of discretion by the respondent Judge.
Issue(s)
Whether the People of the Philippines was deprived of its day in court without due process of law. Whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Amended Decision of August 1, 1980, and the Order dated September 1, 1980, denying a motion for reconsideration thereof. Whether the granting of the petition would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that while the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the new trial and rendering the amended decision acquitting the accused, the error could no longer be rectified due to the fundamental principle of double jeopardy. The judgment of acquittal, though erroneous, was a final verdict that could not be appealed or reopened. Therefore, the petition was denied.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of deprivation of due process: The Court found no deprivation of due process. The prosecution's contention that their counsel was not allowed to argue fully was unsubstantiated by the transcript. The Fiscal was given the opportunity to argue against the motion for new trial and to cross-examine the witness presented during the new trial. The Court noted that the Fiscal had opportunities to file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari between the granting of the new trial and the promulgation of the amended decision but failed to do so. The proceedings were not an absolute nullity, thus the acquittal was not void. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court held that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he granted the new trial. The evidence presented by Leonico Talingdan and Nory S. Fernandez could not be considered newly discovered evidence as they could have been discovered with reasonable diligence during the trial. Furthermore, the proffered evidence was essentially impeaching in character and could not have altered the original judgment of conviction, especially considering the strong evidence presented by the prosecution during the original trial. The Court found it incredible that William Gonzales, if he were the assailant, would have left with the victim on the same motorcycle to seek medical attention. On the issue of double jeopardy: The Court ruled that despite the grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent judge, the error could no longer be rectified due to the principle of double jeopardy. The acquittal of the accused, even if based on erroneous grounds, constituted a final verdict. The proceedings were not an absolute nullity, and the prosecution had opportunities to present its case and rebut evidence. Therefore, the judgment of acquittal was protected by the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, preventing the case from being reopened or appealed.
Main Doctrine
While a judge may commit grave abuse of discretion in granting a new trial based on evidence that is not newly discovered and could not have altered the original judgment, an acquittal rendered thereafter, even if erroneous, is protected by the principle of double jeopardy and cannot be reopened.