Francisco v. Puno
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a parcel of land that Josefina D. Lagar claims is conjugal property. She alleges her father, Dionisio Lagar, improperly titled the land solely in his name as a widower after her mother's death and subsequently sold the entire parcel to the predecessor in interest of the petitioners, from whom they purchased it. Lagar sought reconveyance of one-half of the property and damages. 2. Procedural History: Lagar filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages. The petitioners (defendants) answered, raising defenses of lack of personality to sue, prescription, and good faith as buyers. The case proceeded to pre-trial, where the petitioners failed to appear and were declared in default. Lagar then presented her evidence ex-parte, and the respondent judge dismissed her complaint on January 8, 1980, due to insufficient evidence. Lagar's counsel received a copy of this decision on February 15, 1980. Subsequently, Lagar, through new counsel, filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration on February 16, 1980, alleging newly discovered evidence due to the fault of her previous counsel. This motion was denied on April 28, 1980, for being filed out of time. Undeterred, Lagar, with yet another new counsel, filed a petition for relief from judgment on May 7, 1980. 3. The Petition: The petitioners, Adalia B. Francisco, et al., filed this petition for certiorari challenging the resolution of the respondent judge dated October 8, 1980. This resolution granted private respondent Josefina D. Lagar's petition for relief from the January 8, 1980 judgment that dismissed her complaint. The petitioners argue that the petition for relief was filed out of time, as it was filed more than 60 days after Lagar or her counsel had notice of the judgment. They contend that notice to counsel constitutes notice to the party and that Lagar's own actions, including signing a motion for new trial, demonstrate knowledge of the judgment well before the 60-day period expired. The petitioners assert that the respondent judge acted beyond his jurisdiction in granting the petition for relief.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for relief from judgment, considering the availability of other remedies and the timeliness of the petition. Whether the petition for relief was filed within the reglementary period, considering the notice to counsel and the party's presumed knowledge of the decision.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, set aside the resolution of the respondent judge dated October 8, 1980, and reinstated the decision of January 8, 1980, which dismissed the complaint. The decision of January 8, 1980, was declared final and executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of granting the petition for relief and the judge's discretion: The Court held that a petition for relief under Rule 38 is not favored and is considered an act of grace, not to be used when other adequate remedies at law are available. In this case, the private respondent had already filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, which was denied. The proper remedy after the denial of such a motion is to elevate the denial to a higher court, not to file a petition for relief, as these two remedies are exclusive of each other. Consequently, the respondent judge acted beyond his jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition for relief, and all his actuations in connection therewith were deemed null and void. The original decision dismissing the complaint, having become final and executory, was ordered to be reinstated. On the timeliness of the petition for relief: The petition for relief was filed out of time. The respondent judge's computation, which relied on the private respondent's claim of actual knowledge on March 17, 1980, was erroneous. The Court reiterated the principle that notice to counsel of record is notice to the party. Since the private respondent signed and swore to the motion for new trial filed on February 16, 1980, she was presumed to have knowledge of the decision at least by that date, if not earlier when her first counsel received a copy on January 15, 1980. Therefore, the petition for relief filed on May 7, 1980, was well beyond the 60-day period prescribed by Rule 38, Section 3.
Main Doctrine
A petition for relief under Rule 38 is not a remedy to be availed of when another adequate remedy at law, such as a motion for new trial or reconsideration, was available and pursued. Furthermore, notice to counsel of record is notice to the party for purposes of computing the period for filing a petition for relief, and the period should be reckoned from the date of receipt by counsel, not from the date the party claims to have actual knowledge.