Mitra, Jr. v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. L-56503 · 1981-04-04 · J. FERNANDO, C, J.: · Primary: Political; Secondary: Constitutional Law
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the validity and operative status of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines. Petitioners contend that this Constitution is not in force and effect, asserting that the 1935 Constitution should be operative following the lifting of martial law. They argue that the 1973 Constitution remains in a state of proposal and requires ratification by the people through a plebiscite. 2. Procedural History: This petition for mandamus and prohibition follows similar legal challenges previously dismissed by the Supreme Court, specifically those filed by Samuel C. Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales. These prior cases, like the present one, were predicated on the assumption that the 1973 Constitution was not yet in force. The Supreme Court, in its prior rulings, has consistently upheld the operative status of the 1973 Constitution, citing the Javellana v. Executive Secretary decision and subsequent judicial pronouncements and popular acquiescence through various referendums and elections held under its framework. 3. The Petition: The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus and prohibition, primarily arguing that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law of the land, despite previous rulings to the contrary. They specifically request a plebiscite for the people to vote on the ratification of the Constitution. Their argument hinges on the premise that if rejected, the 1935 Constitution would become operative again after the lifting of martial law. The Supreme Court, however, views this petition as a reiteration of arguments already settled and finds no further judicial obstacle to the 1973 Constitution being considered in force and effect.

Issue(s)

Whether the 1973 Constitution is in force and effect. Whether the Supreme Court has the authority to declare the 1973 Constitution not in force and effect. Whether the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief during martial law were absolute and beyond judicial review.

Ruling

The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The Court ruled that there is no further judicial obstacle to the 1973 Constitution being considered in force and effect, and that the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief during martial law are subject to judicial scrutiny.

Ratio Decidendi

On the force and effect of the 1973 Constitution: The Court reiterated its ruling in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, which dismissed petitions challenging the validity of the 1973 Constitution. The dispositive portion of Javellana stated that there was "no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." The Court noted that eight of the ten members of the Court at that time held this view. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that subsequent referenda and elections held under the present Constitution, including those for the Interim Batasang Pambansa and local government officials, indicated the people's acquiescence and recognition of its force and effect. The Court emphasized that the judiciary is bound to accord recognition once the fact of acceptance by the people of a new fundamental law is made evident. On the Supreme Court's authority and judicial review: The Court affirmed its role in judicial review, stating that it sits "duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution." To contend otherwise would be "an exercise in futility." The Court clarified that the dismissal of petitions challenging the validity of a constitutional act, even if based on the premise that the issue is political, is still a manifestation of judicial review, allowing the political branches to proceed. The Court's function is to check or legitimize acts of coordinate departments challenged in legal proceedings, and its decisions are controlling. On the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief during martial law: The Court clarified the scope of the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief under martial law, referencing the 1935 Constitution. It noted that while the Commander-in-Chief clause is traceable to the U.S. Constitution, the Philippine framers expanded it to include the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law. However, the Court emphasized that martial law, as understood in American jurisprudence and as interpreted in cases like Moyer v. Peabody and Sterling v. Constantine, is subject to judicial scrutiny and is not all-encompassing. The Court cited Willoughby's definition that martial law "goes no further than to warn citizens that the military powers have been called upon by the executive to assist him in the maintenance of law and order." The Court also referred to Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, which affirmed the President's competence to promulgate proclamations, orders, and decrees essential to the security and preservation of the Republic during martial law. Despite these powers, the Court maintained that the judiciary continued to exercise its functions and the power of judicial review during the period of martial law, citing cases where Presidential acts were challenged and reviewed.

Main Doctrine

The Supreme Court, in the exercise of judicial review, is bound to uphold and apply the prevailing Constitution. Contentions that the current Constitution is not in force and effect are dismissed if the Court has already ruled on its validity or if the people have shown acquiescence through referenda and elections. The powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief during martial law are subject to judicial scrutiny but are essential for the preservation of the Republic.

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