Golez v. Leonidas
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case originates from an ejectment suit filed by petitioner Benjamin Y. Golez, represented by his counsel petitioner Reynaldo B. Aralar, against private respondent Vicente V. Aldaba. The ejectment case was assigned to Branch IV of the City Court of Manila, presided over by petitioner City Judge Gerino M. Tolentino. A decision by default was rendered against Aldaba on September 25, 1978. 2. Procedural History: Following the default judgment, Aldaba filed a petition for relief from judgment on November 13, 1978, which was assigned to Branch XXXVIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, presided over by respondent Judge Tomas Leonidas. Judge Leonidas issued a preliminary injunction to stay the execution of the City Court's decision. On February 8, 1979, respondent Judge Leonidas dismissed the petition for relief. Subsequently, petitioners Golez and Tolentino proceeded with the execution of the ejectment judgment. Thereafter, Aldaba filed a petition for contempt against Golez, Aralar, Tolentino, and the sheriff, alleging that the dismissal order had not yet become final. Respondent Judge Leonidas denied the motion to dismiss the contempt petition and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. 3. The Petition: The petitioners, Benjamin Y. Golez, Reynaldo B. Aralar, Gerino M. Tolentino, and Francisco L. Garcia, have filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition. They contend that respondent Judge Leonidas erred in entertaining the contempt petition. The petitioners argue that the dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment automatically dissolved the preliminary injunction, and that the execution of the ejectment judgment was carried out in accordance with legal formalities. They seek to set aside the orders of respondent Judge Leonidas dated June 3, 1980, and March 16, 1981, and to prohibit further proceedings in the contempt petition.
Issue(s)
Whether the dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment automatically carried with it the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction. Whether the writ of execution was validly implemented despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the petition for relief.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The orders of respondent Judge Leonidas dated June 3, 1980, and March 16, 1981, denying the motion to dismiss the petition for contempt and the motion for reconsideration, respectively, were set aside. The respondent judge was directed to desist from further proceeding in the petition for contempt.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the dismissal of the petition for relief automatically lifted the writ of preliminary injunction: The Court held that when respondent Judge Leonidas dismissed the petition for relief from judgment, such dismissal necessarily carried with it the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction he had issued. The Court cited several cases, including Roldan, Jr. vs. Arca, National Sugar Workers' Union vs. La Carlota Sugar Central, Lazaro vs. Mariano, Saavedra vs. Ibanez, and Hi Caiji vs. Phil. Sugar Estates and Development Company, to support the principle that a writ of preliminary injunction is interlocutory and ancillary in character. It is automatically lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, irrespective of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order or an appeal therefrom has expired. This principle is fundamental in remedial law, ensuring that ancillary reliefs do not subsist independently of the principal action. On the issue of whether the writ of execution was validly implemented: The Court found that the writ of execution was implemented with all the formalities of the law and with the least inconvenience to private respondent. The writ of execution was issued on February 20, 1979. While private respondent Aldaba filed a motion for reconsideration on February 21, 1979, this was subsequent to the issuance of the writ of execution. The notice to vacate was issued, and upon motion by the deputy sheriff, authority for forcible opening of the premises was granted, provided it was done in the presence of a police officer. A notice of sale for the seized personal properties was also issued. The Court concluded that the implementation of the writ of execution was lawful, as the injunction had been automatically lifted upon the dismissal of the petition for relief, and the subsequent proceedings were conducted with due regard to legal procedures.
Main Doctrine
The dismissal of a petition for relief from judgment automatically lifts any writ of preliminary injunction issued in connection therewith, regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration has expired. Consequently, a writ of execution issued after the dismissal of the petition for relief, but before the finality of the dismissal order, may be validly implemented.