Philippine National Bank v. Animas
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) is the owner of a parcel of agricultural land (Lot No. 458, 13 hectares) acquired through an auction sale on September 11, 1954, pursuant to a writ of execution against Diamalud Dambong. A Certificate of Judicial Sale was issued on September 13, 1954, and a Definite Deed of Sale on June 11, 1956, both registered under Act 3344. Despite PNB's acquisition of ownership, the defendant, Abi Olipon-Dambong, surviving spouse of Diamalud Dambong, continued to occupy the land. PNB tolerated her possession based on promises to reacquire the property. When these promises failed, PNB made verbal and written demands (last written demand on December 12, 1968) for the defendant to vacate or deliver the income from the land's fruits, estimated at P1,450.00 annually. The defendant refused. Procedural History: PNB filed a complaint for Ejectment with Damages with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of South Cotabato on May 13, 1969. The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the principal cause of action was unlawful detainer, which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court. The CFI, through Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas, granted the motion and dismissed the case on August 26, 1969, finding the action to be one of unlawful detainer within the City Court's jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration was denied on September 13, 1969. The Petition: PNB appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging that the CFI erred in holding that the possession became unlawful only upon demand to vacate and in ruling that the case was an unlawful detainer within the City Court's jurisdiction. PNB contended that since the ejectment case was filed almost 14 years after the expiration of the redemption period (September 11, 1956), it should be considered an 'accion publiciana' (illegal possession) falling under the CFI's exclusive jurisdiction, and that for it to be 'illegal detainer,' it should have been filed within one year from the expiration of the redemption period.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance erred in holding that respondent Abi Olipon-Dambong's possession or withholding of the land became unlawful only from the time demand to vacate was made; specifically, when does possession by tolerance become unlawful, and how does this affect the one-year period for bringing an action for illegal detainer? Whether the Court of First Instance erred in holding that since the complaint was filed within the period of one year after respondent Abi Olipon-Dambong was notified to vacate the land, the principal cause of action is one of unlawful detainer which is within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the city court; specifically, whether the action filed was indeed one of unlawful detainer, and whether the filing was within the prescribed one-year period from the demand to vacate, thus falling under the jurisdiction of the City Court.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, ruling that the case was indeed one of unlawful detainer within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of when possession becomes unlawful: The Supreme Court held that possession by tolerance, as in this case where the petitioner allowed the private respondent to stay on the property after the expiration of the redemption period, does not become unlawful until there is a demand to vacate. The Court cited the case of Prieto vs. Reyes (14 SCRA 430) which established that possession or detainer becomes illegal only from the time of demand to vacate. Therefore, the one-year period for bringing an action for illegal detainer should be counted only from such demand. The Court further reinforced this by referencing Casilan vs. Tomassi (10 SCRA 267), stating that consent to remain in possession, no matter how long, makes the possession lawful. It is only when this consent is withdrawn and a demand to leave is made that the possession becomes unlawful upon refusal or failure to vacate. In this case, the demand to vacate was made on December 12, 1968, and the complaint was filed on May 13, 1969, which is within the one-year period. On the issue of jurisdiction: Based on the determination that the possession became unlawful only upon demand to vacate, the Supreme Court concluded that the action filed was indeed one of unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court. Since the complaint was filed within one year from the demand to vacate, it correctly fell within the purview of unlawful detainer. The petitioner's argument that it should be considered 'accion publiciana' was rejected because the nature of the action was dictated by when the unlawful withholding of possession commenced, which was only after the demand to vacate was made and refused. The Court reiterated that for an action to be considered illegal detainer, it must be filed within one year from the accrual of the cause of action, which in cases of tolerated possession, is the date of the demand to vacate.
Main Doctrine
Possession by tolerance becomes unlawful only upon demand to vacate, and the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer case is counted from the date of such demand.