Santos v. Ganayo

G.R. No. L-31854 · 1982-09-09 · J. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos is the registered owner of Lot 147 (subsequently Lot 147-A-1-A), a 10,000 square meter residential lot in Baguio City, covered by TCT No. T-4583 issued on July 15, 1960. Prior to petitioner's ownership, the lot was co-owned by the Heirs of Molintas and Justo Leaño. In January 1960, the co-owners sold the lot to Pacita Jocson, who then sold it to petitioner on June 11, 1960. Approximately nineteen years prior, on March 12, 1941, Pulmano Molintas executed a 'Promise to Transfer and Convey' to respondent Rosa Ganayo for a portion of 750 square meters of Lot 147, with a stipulation for reimbursement if the promise did not materialize. This was followed by a notarized Agreement on June 27, 1941, where Pulmano Molintas promised to convey a portion of Lot 147 to Rosa Ganayo, acknowledging receipt of P350.00 as advance payment and recognizing Ganayo's house constructed on the portion as an encumbrance. On October 31, 1959, Magdalena Leaño, who later became the registered owner of one-half of the lot, executed an Affidavit stating she had sold 750 square meters to Rosa Ganayo and had no objection to a proposed subdivision plan. However, on December 13, 1961, Magdalena Leaño repudiated this Affidavit. On May 18, 1959, Rosa Ganayo annotated an adverse claim on TCT No. 3789 (Magdalena Leaño's title) based on the Agreement with Pulmano Molintas and Magdalena Leaño's first Affidavit. This adverse claim was carried over to petitioner's TCT No. T-4583. Procedural History: On June 21, 1962, petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City, sitting as a Land Registration Court. Petitioner argued that Pulmano Molintas was not the absolute owner, that Magdalena Leaño repudiated her affidavit, that Ganayo's claim had prescribed and was barred by laches, and that Ganayo had not filed any enforcement case. Respondent Ganayo opposed, asserting co-ownership, awareness of her claim, and a consummated sale. The CFI ordered the cancellation of the adverse claim but also ordered petitioner to pay the reasonable value of Ganayo's improvements. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA set aside the CFI's judgment, ruling that the CFI lacked jurisdiction to hear the case due to the controversial issues of ownership and reimbursement, which should be ventilated in an ordinary civil action. The Petition: Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA erred in finding that the CFI lacked jurisdiction, asserting that Section 110 of the Land Registration Act empowers the CFI to pass upon the validity of an adverse claim and order its cancellation, regardless of the involvement of ownership issues, especially when parties acquiesce to the jurisdiction.

Issue(s)

Whether the Court of First Instance, acting as a Land Registration Court, has jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition for the cancellation of an adverse claim when the issues involve controversial questions of ownership, prescription, and laches. Whether the adverse claim annotated on the title is valid and should be maintained or cancelled.

Ruling

The Supreme Court set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio. The Court ruled that the CFI, acting as a land registration court, had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the adverse claim and order its cancellation. The Court found that the adverse claim was invalid and ordered its cancellation, while also affirming the CFI's order for the petitioner to pay the reasonable value of the improvements made by the respondent on the property.

Ratio Decidendi

On the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court: The Court held that Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) grants the court the power to conduct a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of an adverse claim and to enter such decree as justice and equity may require, including cancellation if found invalid. The Court clarified that Section 110 does not distinguish between a court sitting as a land registration court and a court of general jurisdiction in determining the validity of an adverse claim. Furthermore, even if issues of ownership, prescription, and laches are involved, the jurisdiction of the land registration court can be sustained if the parties acquiesce to its determination and are given full opportunity to present their evidence. This principle was reiterated in cases such as Paz Ty Sin Tei vs. Jose Lee Dy Piao and Manalo vs. Mariano. The Court emphasized that the otherwise rigid rule regarding the limited jurisdiction of land registration courts has been relaxed in special and exceptional circumstances, including mutual consent or acquiescence of the parties and full opportunity to present evidence. The Court noted that in this case, both parties presented their evidence, thereby acquiescing to the jurisdiction of the CFI. The Court also pointed out that treating this as a procedural issue that could be waived, rather than a jurisdictional one, would prevent undue prolongation of the case, which had been pending for eleven years. On the validity of the adverse claim: The Court agreed with the findings of the lower court that the adverse claim was invalid. The Court noted that the agreement between Pulmano Molintas and Rosa Ganayo was merely a promise to transfer and convey, not a deed of absolute sale. The receipts of payment were by virtue of this promise. Pulmano Molintas was not the absolute owner of the entire lot, and at the time of the alleged sale, his portion was undivided. The agreement was not signed by Justo Leaño, the other co-owner. Furthermore, Magdalena Leaño repudiated her earlier affidavit supporting Ganayo's claim and testified that she never sold the portion to Ganayo. The Court also found that Ganayo's claim was barred by prescription and laches, as she failed to file an action to enforce her alleged right within the statutory period after the agreement in 1941. The Court applied Article 1403 of the Civil Code, stating that an agreement for the sale of real property must be in writing, and Ganayo's attempt to prove a verbal deed of sale was untenable. Therefore, the adverse claim, lacking a valid basis and being barred by prescription and laches, was correctly ordered to be cancelled.

Main Doctrine

A Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, has jurisdiction to determine the validity of an adverse claim and order its cancellation, even if issues of ownership, prescription, or laches are involved, provided the parties acquiesce to its determination in the land registration proceeding and are given full opportunity to present their evidence.

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