Que v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case originates from a dispute over a two-hectare parcel of land. The petitioner, Gervacio Luis Que, claims ownership of this land based on a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in his favor on September 30, 1944, by the spouses Lino Dizon and Maria Villanueva Dizon. Subsequently, a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 8848) was issued in the names of the Dizon spouses, encompassing this two-hectare portion along with other lands. The Dizon spouses later mortgaged several properties, including the disputed two hectares, to the Philippine National Bank. In 1965, the Dizon spouses executed another Deed of Absolute Sale, transferring nearly all their properties, including the two-hectare parcel, to their children. This led to the cancellation of TCT No. 8848 and the issuance of a new title (TCT No. 107110) in the names of the children. The petitioner alleges this second sale was simulated, fictitious, and fraudulent, intended to evade taxes and defraud creditors, and that it prevented the execution of a favorable decision he obtained in a prior case concerning the two-hectare land. Procedural History: The petitioner initially filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 47265) in 1961 to compel the surrender of the title for segregation of his two-hectare land. This case was dismissed due to improper venue. He then filed another complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7143) in 1962 for the same purpose. A decision was rendered in his favor in Civil Case No. 7143 on October 21, 1966. However, the defendants appealed this decision, and the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failure to show timely filing. The defendants then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court to review this dismissal, which was given due course and was pending. Despite the favorable decision in Civil Case No. 7143, its execution was hindered due to the pending Supreme Court case. Subsequently, the petitioner filed the present complaint (Civil Case No. Q-12845) in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, seeking the nullity or rescission of the 1965 Deed of Absolute Sale and other reliefs. The respondent court dismissed this complaint on July 1, 1969, finding the action premature due to the pending certiorari case before the Supreme Court, and denied the motion for reconsideration on December 16, 1969. The petitioner is now appealing these dismissal orders. The Petition: The petitioner is appealing the dismissal orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, dated July 1, 1969, and December 16, 1969. The appeal argues that the lower court erred in dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-12845 on the ground that it stated no cause of action and was premature. The petitioner contends that his right to the two-hectare land, based on the 1944 Deed of Absolute Sale, had been violated by the subsequent fraudulent transfer of properties through the 1965 Deed of Absolute Sale, which prevented the execution of a prior favorable judgment. He asserts that the pendency of a certiorari case before the Supreme Court concerning the appeal of Civil Case No. 7143 should not preclude his current action to declare the 1965 deed null and void and to secure his property rights. The petitioner seeks the reversal of the dismissal orders and prays for the nullification of the 1965 Deed of Absolute Sale, the release of encumbrances on his land, and alternative relief including damages and attorney's fees.
Issue(s)
Whether the complaint states a valid cause of action. Whether the action filed was premature.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The Court held that the action was premature because the legal right of the petitioner to the two-hectare land had not been finally determined due to the pendency of a certiorari proceeding before the Supreme Court concerning the decision in Civil Case No. 7143. An action prematurely commenced is a groundless suit and should be dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1 (Cause of Action): The Court reiterated the rule that in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered, hypothetically admitting their truth. The test is whether the court could render a valid judgment based on these allegations. On Issue 2 (Prematurity): The Court found that the decision in Civil Case No. 7143, which petitioner sought to enforce, had not become final and executory, as evidenced by the allegation that it could not be executed despite an order of special execution. The pendency of the certiorari proceedings before the Supreme Court, initiated by the Dizon spouses who claimed the transaction was a loan and not a sale, meant that the petitioner's right to the land was still under judicial scrutiny. Therefore, the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-12845 was premature. The Court emphasized the principle that to recover at all, there must be a cause of action at the commencement of the suit. An action prematurely brought is a groundless suit and should not be entertained, as it is against public policy to summon individuals to answer complaints that are not yet ripe for adjudication. The Court cited Justice Laurel in Surigao Mine Exploration Co. vs. C. Harris, et al., stating that an action prematurely brought is a groundless suit.
Main Doctrine
An action prematurely commenced is a groundless suit and should be dismissed, as there must be a cause of action at the commencement of the suit, which requires a final and conclusive judicial pronouncement that the legal right of the petitioner has been violated.