Bien v. Sunga
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Raymundo S. Katigbak filed an action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land against Ramon Imperial, et al. Intervenors, including petitioners, filed a complaint in intervention claiming ownership of portions of the land. The trial court dismissed the complaint in intervention, asserting lack of jurisdiction as the land was public domain. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed the main complaint, finding the land to be private property. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, declaring Katigbak the owner and ordering defendants or those occupying the land to vacate. Procedural History: The judgment became final and executory on January 21, 1969. The records were remanded for execution. Katigbak filed a motion for execution on April 7, 1969, and a writ of execution was issued on June 27, 1969. Petitioners moved to quash the writ, arguing prescription and lack of jurisdiction over them. An amended writ of execution was issued on July 28, 1969, but was not fully implemented due to pleas for time to relocate. On March 6, 1974, Katigbak filed a motion for an alias order of demolition. The respondent judge issued an order for demolition on May 22, 1974. After an ocular inspection and denial of a motion for reconsideration, an alias writ of demolition was issued on September 17, 1974. The Petition: Petitioners sought to annul and set aside the order of demolition, alleging it was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion because the motion for execution was filed after the five-year period and that the order was directed at persons not parties to the case. A temporary restraining order was issued.
Issue(s)
Whether the motion for execution of judgment was filed beyond the reglementary period. Whether the alias writ of demolition could be enforced against petitioners who were not original parties to the case.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is lifted and set aside.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription of the motion for execution: The Court held that the motion for execution was filed within the reglementary period. The judgment became final and executory on January 21, 1969. A motion for execution was filed on April 7, 1969, within the five-year period. While the initial writ of execution was not fully implemented, a motion for an alias writ of demolition was filed on March 6, 1974. The period between the issuance of the unexecuted writ of execution (July 28, 1969) and the motion for the alias writ (March 6, 1974) was four years, seven months, and nine days, which is well within the five-year period. The Court also noted that delays occasioned by the debtor can extend the time for issuing a writ of execution. The general rule is that the time during which execution is stayed should not be included in the computation of the prescriptive period. On the issue of whether the alias writ of demolition could be enforced against petitioners who were not original parties to the case: The Court differentiated between the petitioners. It found that Feliciano Navarro, Marcelino Abelende, Salvador Peconcillo, and Benjamin Peconcillo, Jr. were indeed strangers to the case, as they were not found to be landowners, tillers, occupants, or house-owners on the land during the service of the writs and had no cause of action against the respondents. However, Vicente Benavente, Carlos Barcela, and Manuel Peconcillo were considered successors-in-interest of the original intervenors and were therefore bound by the judgment because their claims of ownership were derived from parties who were involved in the litigation, making them subject to the court's orders.
Main Doctrine
A motion for execution of judgment filed within the five-year period from its finality is valid, and the subsequent issuance of an alias writ of demolition, even if delayed, is permissible if the initial execution was stayed or interrupted. Furthermore, individuals occupying the disputed land who are successors-in-interest of the original parties are bound by the judgment.