Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Peña & Marcos v. Juan

G.R. No. L-49140 · 1982-11-19 · J. DE CASTRO, J.: · Primary: Commercial; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: Filipinas Carriers, Inc. (Filcar) filed a complaint for sum of money, enforcement of lien, and damages against various entities, including AB Charles Thorburn & Co. (Thorburn), alleging unpaid charter hire for the vessel MV San Vicente. Filcar claimed a lien on the cargo due to Thorburn's failure to pay, and sought the sale of the cargo to satisfy its claims. Sierra Madre Wood Industries, Inc. (Sierra Madre) intervened, also claiming a lien over the cargo based on its own charter of the vessel to Filcar. 2. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Manila (CFI Manila), presided over by Judge Celestino P. Juan, ordered the private sale of the cargo due to its deteriorating condition and the vessel's need for repairs. This order was issued despite jurisdictional challenges raised by Ahmed Baroom, represented by the petitioner law firm, Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Valmonte Peña & Marcos. Subsequently, the petitioner law firm filed a separate case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (CFI Rizal) to recover professional fees from Baroom, obtaining a writ of preliminary attachment over the same cargo. Judge Juan of CFI Manila later approved the sale of the cargo to Apollo Kokin Trading Co., Ltd., and subsequently, Filcar assigned its rights to Sierra Madre, which was also approved by Judge Juan. CFI Rizal initially dismissed the petitioner's case and lifted the attachment, but later reinstated it. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order, but the cargo had already been loaded onto a foreign vessel and sold. 3. The Petition: The petitioner law firm filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, assailing the August 25, 1978 order of Judge Juan approving the sale of the cargo. The petitioner argued that the CFI Manila had not acquired jurisdiction over the defendants or the res because there was no proper seizure of property under legal process, and that the CFI Rizal had acquired prior jurisdiction over the res. The petitioner sought to enforce its attorney's lien on the proceeds of the sale. The Supreme Court found that the CFI Manila had jurisdiction over the quasi in rem action and that Baroom had submitted to its jurisdiction by filing counterclaims. The Court also noted that the petitioner's claim for attorney's lien should have been pursued in the CFI Manila, which had control over the property and its proceeds. Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no abuse of discretion by the respondent judge and noting that the sale of the cargo had already been completed, rendering the issue moot.

Issue(s)

Whether the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant Baroom. Whether the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the res (the cargo). Whether the respondent court's order approving the sale of the cargo was issued with grave abuse of discretion, interfering with the writ of attachment issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Whether petitioner is entitled to an attorney's lien on the proceeds of the sale.

Ruling

The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. The order approving the sale of the cargo is upheld.

Ratio Decidendi

On the jurisdiction over the person of defendant Baroom: The Court held that while the respondent court may not have had jurisdiction over Baroom at the initial stage, his subsequent filing of an answer with a counterclaim and cross-claim constituted a voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction, thereby abandoning any prior objections. This is consistent with the principle that a party invoking the court's jurisdiction for a counterclaim submits to that jurisdiction. The Court cited Merchant's Heat and Light Co. vs. Clow & Sons to emphasize that a defendant who becomes a plaintiff by filing a counterclaim invokes the court's jurisdiction and must accept the consequences. Therefore, any initial lack of jurisdiction over Baroom's person was cured by his subsequent actions. On the jurisdiction over the res (the cargo): The Court ruled that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the res. It clarified that in actions quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the property is essential. While an attachment proceeding typically requires seizure to confer jurisdiction, this is not necessary when a lien already exists. The Court found that a maritime lien existed in favor of Filcar due to unpaid charter hire, which is equivalent to an attachment. Furthermore, the property was already in the possession of a private respondent, making the res within the court's jurisdiction for the enforcement of the lien. The Court cited Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca and Roller v. Holly to support the principle that an existing lien obviates the need for preliminary seizure. On the alleged interference with the writ of attachment and grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion. It explained that by the time the writ of attachment was issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the respondent judge in Manila already had control and disposition of the case and the property. The order approving the sale was merely an implementation of an earlier order based on extreme necessity due to the deteriorating condition of the cargo and the vessel. The Court emphasized that a court in possession of property involved in litigation exercises exclusive jurisdiction, and another court of concurrent jurisdiction cannot interfere. The petitioner's act of filing an independent case for attorney's lien was deemed an improper attempt to circumvent the jurisdiction of the court already seized of the matter. On the entitlement to an attorney's lien: The Court held that petitioner was not entitled to an attorney's lien. It noted that the attorney's lien, whether retaining or charging, applies to funds or judgments lawfully in the attorney's possession or secured by them. Petitioner was claiming a charging lien, but at the time of its filing, the orders for the sale of the cargoes were already in existence and in favor of the private respondent. The petitioner's client had also abandoned the case, meaning there was no favorable judgment to secure a charging lien upon. The Court reiterated that the claim for professional fees should have been filed as a simple complaint in intervention before the respondent court, which had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the cargoes.

Main Doctrine

A court acquires jurisdiction over the res in a quasi in rem action when a maritime lien exists, even without a writ of attachment, as the lien is equivalent to seizure. Furthermore, a defendant who files a counterclaim submits to the court's jurisdiction, abandoning any prior objections.

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