Arevalo v. Quilatan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Anastacio Arevalo and Pilar Silverio (Arevalos) were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11045 before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, with respondents Valentin Quilatan et al. as defendants. The Arevalos filed a complaint on July 10, 1968. Summons was issued on July 25, 1968, and served on August 2, 1968, by the Deputy Sheriff of Rizal. The Sheriff's Return stated that service was made upon the Arevalos' daughter-in-law, Luz Esgueres, a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at Pulang-lupa, Las Piñas, Rizal, who refused to acknowledge receipt. Procedural History: Due to the Arevalos' failure to file an answer, they were declared in default, and ex-parte judgment was rendered on February 14, 1969. Pilar Silverio received a copy of the decision by mail on June 20, 1969. The copy intended for Anastacio Arevalo was returned unclaimed. He ultimately received a copy of the decision and writ of execution on August 26, 1969. The Arevalos claimed they no longer resided at No. 211 Pulang-lupa, Las Piñas, Rizal, where summons was served, but at No. 196 Pulang-lupa, Las Piñas, Rizal. They admitted No. 211 belonged to them, where their son and daughter-in-law resided. They averred Luz Esgueres forgot about the papers, and Pilar Silverio claimed illiteracy and ignorance regarding the decision's significance. The Arevalos filed Civil Case No. 12229 to annul the default judgment, with the sole issue being the validity of the substituted service of summons. The Petition: The Court of Appeals, on reconsideration, reversed its earlier decision and held that the substituted service of summons was valid. The Arevalos filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' findings on residence, the use of voter's registration records, and the validity of the substituted service.
Issue(s)
Whether the substituted service of summons upon the petitioners was valid. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petitioners had not transferred their residence from House No. 211 to House No. 196 Pulang-lupa, Las Piñas, Rizal. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider the petitioners' voter's registration record as evidence of their continued residence at House No. 211.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court found that the substituted service of summons was not valid.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the substituted service of summons: The Court held that the substituted service of summons was invalid because the sheriff's return did not sufficiently establish compliance with the requirements of Section 8 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The return failed to indicate the impossibility of prompt personal service and the efforts made to find the defendants personally, which should be stated in the proof of service. Furthermore, the return did not clearly show that the service was made at the "defendant's dwelling house or residence" as required. While the summons was left with the daughter-in-law, Luz Esgueres, who resided at No. 211 Pulang-lupa, Las Piñas, Rizal, and claimed it was the Arevalos' residence, the Court found that the petitioners presented proof, believed by the trial court, that they actually lived at No. 196 Pulang-lupa. The Court emphasized that Section 8 of Rule 14 refers to living or dwelling therein, not merely ownership. The Court cited J. M. Tuason & Co. vs. Fernandez (12 SCRA 335) to support the principle that service of summons upon a person not authorized to receive it at a house owned by the defendant but not their dwelling house or residence is invalid. The Court also noted that the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals gave undue decisive importance to the fact that some belongings of the petitioners were still found at No. 211, but residence is defined as the place where one is habitually present and intends to return, which is equivalent to a permanent abode or home where the defendants eat and sleep. The Court found it unnatural that Luz Esgueres would forget to give the summons to her in-laws, and equally unnatural for Mrs. Arevalo not to inquire about the contents of the mail due to her alleged illiteracy, suggesting a deliberate attempt to avoid service until the writ of execution was imminent. On the residence of the petitioners: The Court found merit in the assignment of error regarding the petitioners' residence. While the sheriff's return stated service was made at "Pulang-lupa, Las Piñas, Rizal," and the daughter-in-law declared it was the Arevalos' residence, the Court gave weight to the petitioners' evidence, believed by the trial court, that they resided at No. 196 Pulang-lupa. The Court distinguished this case from others by noting that residence is a broad term, but it must be the place where the defendant habitually resides. The Court also pointed out that the registration of a store at No. 211 in the name of Luz Esgueres in 1967, as found by the trial court, further supported the claim that the Arevalos had moved out. The Court reiterated that even if No. 211 was still owned by the petitioners, it was not their dwelling house or residence at the time of service, which is the critical factor for valid substituted service. On the voter's registration record: The Court found no merit in the assignment of error concerning the voter's registration record (Exhibit 6). The Court noted that the record was filed in 1965 and approved in 1965, making it insufficient to accurately establish the residence of Anastacio Arevalo on August 2, 1968, more than three years later. Therefore, this evidence was not given decisive weight in determining the validity of the service.
Main Doctrine
Substituted service of summons must strictly comply with statutory requirements, particularly regarding the impossibility of prompt personal service and the service being made at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein. A sheriff's return that does not affirmatively show compliance with these requirements is insufficient to establish jurisdiction.