De Guzman v. Subido
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns whether a person is disqualified from appointment to the Quezon City Police Force due to admitting to violations of city ordinances, specifically jaywalking and an ordinance requiring a cochero to occupy only the designated seat in a calesa. The petitioner, Ernesto M. de Guzman, was appointed as a patrolman but his appointment was questioned based on his answers to an information sheet regarding any criminal records. 2. Procedural History: Petitioner Ernesto M. de Guzman was appointed patrolman on August 16, 1965, and completed police training. His appointment papers were forwarded to the Civil Service Commissioner on March 21, 1966. After a year of inaction, his salary payments were stopped. On May 12, 1967, the Civil Service Commissioner returned the appointment papers, disqualifying de Guzman under Republic Act No. 4864, Section 9(5), which requires appointees to have 'no criminal record.' This decision was based on de Guzman's admission of jaywalking and violating a cochero ordinance. De Guzman then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed his petition on May 29, 1969, ruling that any criminal record, including ordinance violations, disqualified him. 3. The Petition: This case is before the Supreme Court on a petition for review. The petitioner argues that violations of municipal ordinances, such as jaywalking and a cochero ordinance, do not constitute a 'criminal record' that would disqualify him under the Police Act of 1966. He contends that the legislative intent behind the 'no criminal record' requirement was not to encompass minor ordinance violations, citing American jurisprudence that distinguishes between violations of public laws and municipal regulations. The petitioner also argues that the Civil Service Commissioner exceeded the 180-day period for acting on appointment papers, rendering his appointment complete by default.
Issue(s)
Whether violations of municipal ordinances, specifically jaywalking and a cochero regulation, constitute a 'criminal record' that disqualifies an individual for appointment to the Quezon City Police Force under Republic Act No. 4864. Whether the Civil Service Commissioner's inaction on the appointment papers for over 180 days constitutes approval.
Ruling
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the lower court. It directed the Integrated National Police and respondent officials to reinstate the petitioner to the Quezon City Police Force, provided he meets current qualifications. The city government and its officials were ordered to pay the petitioner unpaid services, allowances, and five years' backpay from the date of termination.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of 'criminal record' and municipal ordinances: The Court found itself constrained to grant the petition. It acknowledged the policy of attracting the best qualified for government service, as reiterated in Republic Act No. 2260 and Presidential Decree No. 807. The Court reasoned that automatically excluding individuals for minor ordinance violations, such as jaywalking or obscure cochero regulations, committed perhaps in an 'absent minded mood' or while hurrying, would be unreasonable and oppressive. While not going as far as to state that only violations of national statutes constitute 'crimes' or 'criminal records,' the Court recognized the distinction in municipal corporation law between acts intrinsically punishable as public offenses and those relating to municipal regulations for peace, good order, health, safety, and comfort. The Court emphasized that a penalty for breaching a municipal regulation is not necessarily an exercise of sovereign authority to define crimes. For a violation of a municipal ordinance to qualify as a 'crime' in the context of disqualification for public office, it must involve a certain degree of 'evil doing, immoral conduct, corruption, malice, or want of principles reasonably related to the requirements of the public office.' The Court cited American jurisprudence distinguishing between public laws of the state and local laws of a municipal corporation. Therefore, the mere payment of a nominal fine for jaywalking or a minor ordinance violation should not be considered a disqualifying 'criminal record' under the Police Act of 1966. Respondent Subido should have investigated the nature of the petitioner's acts rather than treating every 'Yes' answer as an automatic disqualification. On the Civil Service Commissioner's inaction: The Court noted that under Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the Commissioner had 180 days to act on appointment papers. Inaction beyond this period implies approval. The respondent commissioner returned the papers more than a year after receipt, which was beyond the prescribed period. Consequently, the appointment, lacking any defect other than the disputed 'criminal record' issue, must be deemed complete and properly made after the 180-day period. The termination of the petitioner's services was therefore illegal and invalid.
Main Doctrine
Violations of municipal or city ordinances, particularly those involving minor infractions like jaywalking or specific cochero regulations, which result in the payment of a nominal fine, do not automatically constitute a 'criminal record' that disqualifies an individual from appointment to the police force under the Police Act of 1966, unless such violations involve a degree of evil doing or moral turpitude reasonably related to the requirements of public office.