People v. Dioscoro Jose
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Accused-appellants Dioscoro Jose and Dominador Bajao were charged with murder and frustrated murder for an incident that occurred on October 22, 1970, within the New Bilibid Prisons. The information alleged that while confined, the appellants, conspiring and armed with improvised deadly weapons, assaulted fellow inmates Crisanto Fajardo and Marciano Sulit. Sulit sustained multiple stab wounds resulting in his death, while Fajardo suffered a stab wound that could have been fatal without timely medical intervention. Both victims were unarmed and unable to defend themselves. 2. Procedural History: Following their arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty to the charges before the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal. Despite the guilty pleas, the trial court ordered the presentation of evidence to ascertain guilt and culpability. The court found both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and frustrated murder, imposing the death penalty and ordering them to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Marciano Sulit. The case was automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court. During the review, Dioscoro Jose died, and the case against him was dismissed concerning his criminal liability, leaving Dominador Bajao as the sole appellant. 3. The Petition: In their appeal, the appellants, through their counsel de oficio, contended that the trial court erred in convicting them based on extrajudicial confessions and guilty pleas that were allegedly infirm. They argued that conspiracy was not sufficiently established independently of these confessions and pleas. Specifically, Bajao challenged the voluntariness of his extrajudicial confession, claiming it was made under duress and while suffering from injuries. He also questioned the validity of his guilty plea, asserting he was not properly assisted by counsel. The Supreme Court, however, found Bajao's confession admissible as it predated the New Constitution and noted that he was assisted by counsel during arraignment. While acknowledging the confession's admissibility, the Court found insufficient independent evidence of conspiracy for both crimes. It determined that Bajao was guilty only of attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Crisanto Fajardo, not frustrated murder, due to the nature of the wounds. His liability was increased by the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, and the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty was not considered.
Issue(s)
Whether the extrajudicial confessions and guilty pleas are admissible and free from constitutional and legal infirmity. Whether the trial court properly found the existence of conspiracy between the accused on the basis of confessions and guilty pleas. Whether the evidence warranted conviction for murder or frustrated murder vs. attempted murder. Whether the evidence as presented was consistent with the accused's innocence and therefore insufficient to sustain conviction. Whether the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism applies and the effect of such circumstance on the mitigating value of a plea of guilty.
Ruling
The Court held that the extrajudicial confession of Dominador Bajao, having been given before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, was admissible. The Court found that conspiracy could not be established solely on the basis of confessions or guilty pleas and must be proved by independent evidence. Dominador Bajao was found guilty only of attempted murder (not frustrated murder) and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay costs. The case against Dioscoro Jose was dismissed insofar as his criminal liability is concerned due to his death.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the extrajudicial confessions and guilty pleas are admissible and free from constitutional and legal infirmity: The Court reasoned that the confession of Bajao was executed before the effectivity of the New Constitution of 1973 and therefore is admissible under controlling precedent. Applying Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4, the Court explained that the New Constitution's requirement to inform an accused of the right to counsel only operates prospectively from its effectivity on January 17, 1973; confessions obtained before that date remain admissible even if presented after that date. The Court further found the circumstances of the signing and the presence of witnesses, as well as the presumption that prison officers performed their duties regularly, inconsistent with the claim of involuntariness. The Court noted that Bajao was assisted by counsel at arraignment and the transcript shows the accused acknowledged the consequences of pleading guilty; hence the plea did not suffer from the asserted infirmity. Finally, the Court balanced the medical evidence and the timing of the confession, concluding admissibility and probative value were not negated by the accused's contentions. On Whether conspiracy was proved independent of confessions and pleas: The Court held that conspiracy "must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession" and cannot be inferred solely from a confession or a guilty plea. Citing People v. Chaw Yaw Shun, 23 SCRA 127, the Court emphasized that conspiracy must be shown with the same degree of proof required for the substantive crime. The Court examined the record and found no independent evidence establishing that Bajao participated in the stabbing resulting in the death of the deceased; the only evidence of joint action was the accuseds' statements and pleas. Given the absence of corroborative proof of an agreement or joint participation, the Court refused to uphold a finding of conspiracy based only on confessions. The Court thus declined to impute liability for the fatal injury to Bajao by virtue of a supposed conspiracy. On Whether the evidence warranted conviction for murder or frustrated murder vs. attempted murder: The Court reviewed the medical testimony of Dr. Avelina Alcantara and noted her opinion that the wound inflicted on the surviving victim would not have caused death absent complications and that the victim was confined eleven days only. From this the Court concluded the evidence supports a finding of attempted murder rather than frustrated murder. The Court applied the legal distinction between frustrated and attempted offenses and determined that the physical effects and medical testimony did not establish that death was imminent or that the act had produced all the acts of execution necessary for consummation. Therefore, Bajao's act was properly characterized as attempted murder. The Court adjusted the conviction accordingly. The evidence as presented was not consistent with the accused's innocence and therefore sufficient to sustain conviction. On the application of quasi-recidivism and effect on mitigating plea of guilty: The Court found that Bajao, already previously convicted and serving sentence, committed a new felony while serving that sentence, thereby bringing into play the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code. Because quasi-recidivism increases the prescribed penalty to its maximum period for the new felony, the Court held that the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty could not be considered to reduce the penalty. The Court thus imposed an indeterminate penalty within the statutorily increased range, fixing the minimum and maximum periods as provided in the judgment.
Main Doctrine
Extrajudicial confessions given before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution are admissible; conspiracy cannot be inferred solely from confessions or guilty pleas and must be proved by independent evidence; where evidence shows the injury could not have caused death absent complications, the proper characterization is attempted murder rather than frustrated murder; quasi-recidivism increases the applicable penalty and may negate mitigating value of a plea of guilty.