People v. Mosquera
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On June 12, 1972, during an Independence Day dance in Patnongan, Antique, Ricardo Guillermo, Jr. was stabbed. Gervacio Dubria testified that he saw the brothers Donald and Domingo Mosquera, Jr. holding the victim's hands while Donald shouted 'Stab him,' after which an unrecognized person stabbed the victim. The victim was brought to a rural health center where he gave a dying declaration identifying Junior Crespo as his assailant. He was then rushed to the Antique Provincial Hospital where Fiscal Enrique Gumban took a second dying declaration, implicating Junior Crespo, Donald Mosquera, and Ontoy Mosquera. The victim died shortly thereafter, and the autopsy revealed the cause of death as 'Shock secondary to hemorrhage, severe, due to stab wound abdomen.' The accused, Donald and Domingo Mosquera, Jr., claimed alibi, stating they were inside a bakery drinking beer. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Antique found Donald Mosquera guilty as principal and Domingo Mosquera, Jr. guilty as accomplice for the crime of murder. They were sentenced accordingly and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The Petition: The accused appealed the decision of the trial court.
Issue(s)
Whether the defense of alibi is tenable against positive identification. Whether the second dying declaration of the victim was admissible and trustworthy. Whether Domingo Mosquera, Jr. should be considered an accomplice or a principal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification, sentencing Domingo Mosquera, Jr. to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, thus finding both accused guilty as principals. The appeal was denied.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of alibi versus positive identification: The Court held that the defense of alibi cannot stand against convincing proof of physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime, which was not established here as the bakery was only one braza away from the scene. Furthermore, the accused were positively identified by Gervacio Dubria, who knew them well and could not have been mistaken due to the illumination from the petromax lamp. The rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by a witness is well-established. The prosecution witness had no apparent motive to testify falsely against the accused. On the admissibility and trustworthiness of the second dying declaration: The Court found the second dying declaration admissible and more trustworthy. While the victim was in a weakened condition, he was still conscious or semi-conscious and capable of articulating what happened to him. The fact that he did not know what was happening around him did not necessarily render him incompetent as a witness for the purpose of admissibility. Moreover, the second dying declaration was taken closer to the time of death (1:15 a.m. on June 13, 1972) compared to the first (11:30 p.m. on June 12, 1972), making it more indicative of his state in extremis and thus more trustworthy. On the classification of Domingo Mosquera, Jr.'s participation: The Court found that the evidence showed both Donald and Domingo, Jr. cooperated in the commission of the crime by holding the hands of the deceased when he was stabbed by another person. This cooperation, as testified by Gervacio Dubria, where they held the victim's hands and Donald shouted the command to stab, established their participation as principals, not merely accomplices. Their act of holding the victim's hands rendered him defenseless and helpless, enabling the commission of the crime without risk to the assailants, which constitutes treachery.
Main Doctrine
Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by a witness. The admissibility and trustworthiness of a dying declaration depend on the declarant's consciousness and the proximity to death, with statements made closer to death being more trustworthy. Cooperation in holding the victim's hands during a stabbing constitutes participation as principals.