Co v. Salvador
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Private respondents, spouses Eduardo R. Memije and Adelaida H. Memije, purchased a house and lot in Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal, from Ruperto Padonan. However, Padonan remained in possession of the property, and the vendees sought a writ of possession to be placed in possession of the property they had purchased. 2. Procedural History: The respondent judge issued a writ of possession, conditioned upon the posting of a bond. When the writ was served, it was discovered that the petitioners, spouses Romeo and Marcelita Co, were occupying the premises. The petitioners filed a motion to quash the writ, arguing they occupied the property after the decree of registration. The respondent judge denied this motion, stating the writ was issued in a plenary action for possession, not a registration case. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading to the present recourse. 3. The Petition: The petitioners seek a writ of possession to quash the writ issued by the respondent judge. They argue that a writ of possession is not applicable when the occupants acquired possession after the decree of registration and that they cannot be ousted without proper recovery proceedings, as they have been in possession of the property long after the issuance of the decree.
Issue(s)
Whether a writ of possession may be issued in land registration proceedings against third parties who occupied the property after the decree of registration was issued. Whether the respondent judge erred in denying the omnibus motion to quash the writ of possession.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED, and the order of the respondent judge issued on December 24, 1976, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether a writ of possession may be issued in land registration proceedings against third parties who occupied the property after the decree of registration was issued: The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners that the respondent judge erred. A writ of possession does not lie in registration proceedings when those against whom it is sought to be enforced have acquired and are in possession of the land which is the subject of the writ, after the judgment of adjudication was issued. In the present case, the decree of registration was issued in 1908, while the petitioners occupied the property only in 1973, long after the issuance of the decree. The Court emphasized that while under the Land Registration Law, title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is indispensable to resort to the proceedings established by law to recover possession from a third person. Regardless of any title or lack of title to hold possession of the lots in question, the petitioners cannot be ousted without giving them their day in court in a proper recovery proceedings. On the issue of whether the respondent judge erred in denying the omnibus motion to quash the writ of possession: The Supreme Court found the respondent judge's denial to be without basis. The judge's reasoning that the writ of possession was not asked nor issued in a land registration case was contradicted by the fact that the ex-parte motion for the issuance of the writ of possession was filed as an incident in the land registration case. Therefore, the denial of the motion to quash was an error.
Main Doctrine
A writ of possession does not lie in registration proceedings when those against whom it is sought to be enforced have acquired and are in possession of the land which is the subject of the writ, after the judgment of adjudication was issued. In such cases, resort to proper recovery proceedings is indispensable.