Republic v. Mendoza
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Private respondent Robert Arevalo filed an application for the registration of title to six parcels of land totaling over 121 hectares. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, initially filed oppositions to the application. A general order of default was declared against the whole world, excluding the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development. The respondent judge subsequently rendered a decision confirming Arevalo's title and ordering its registration. 2. Procedural History: Following the decision confirming title, the private respondent filed a motion for the issuance of a decree, asserting the decision had become final and executory. The respondent judge granted this motion, and a decree of registration and certificate of title were issued. Subsequently, the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a notice of appeal and record of appeal. The private respondent moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was filed out of time. The respondent judge granted this motion, dismissing the Republic's appeal. 3. The Petition: The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to annul the order dismissing its appeal, the decree of registration, and the certificate of title. The core issue presented to the Supreme Court is whether the thirty-day period to appeal should be counted from the service of the decision upon the provincial fiscal or from the time it was received by the Solicitor General. The petitioner argues that the appeal period should commence from the Solicitor General's receipt of the decision, citing precedent, while the private respondent relies on a ruling that service upon the fiscal binds the Republic. The petitioner contends that its notice of appearance explicitly requested service upon the Solicitor General in Manila and that only notices served on him would bind the government, distinguishing the present case from prior rulings.
Issue(s)
Whether the thirty-day period to appeal should be counted from the service of the decision upon the provincial fiscal or from the time it was received by the Solicitor General. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Republic's appeal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the order disallowing the petitioner's appeal. It directed the respondent court to certify the appeal and transmit the records to the appellate court. The decree of registration and the certificate of title issued were ordered cancelled for having been prematurely issued.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the appeal period: The Court held that the thirty-day period to appeal should be counted from the date the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision. This is because the Solicitor General, in his notice of appearance, expressly requested that all notices of hearings, orders, resolutions, decisions, and other processes be served upon him in Manila. He explicitly stated that "only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will bind" the Government. The Court clarified that while the Provincial Fiscal was authorized to appear, the Solicitor General retained supervision and control, and his separate appearance and specific request for service were paramount. The Court distinguished this case from Republic v. Director of Lands (71 SCRA 426), where service upon the provincial fiscal was binding because the fiscal was authorized to file pleadings for the Government. In the present case, the Solicitor General's office filed the pleadings, and the fiscal's authority was confined to attending hearings. The Court emphasized that the ruling in Republic v. Polo (89 SCRA 33) was controlling, which held that service upon the city fiscal did not operate as service upon the Solicitor General when the latter made a separate appearance and requested direct service. On the issue of the dismissal of the appeal: The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Republic's appeal. The dismissal was based on the erroneous computation of the appeal period. Since the appeal was perfected on time according to the correct computation, it should have been given due course. The premature issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title, which were predicated on the erroneous finality of the decision, were consequently ordered cancelled.
Main Doctrine
The thirty-day period to appeal in land registration cases, where the Solicitor General has made a separate appearance and expressly requested that all notices be served upon him, should be counted from the date the Solicitor General receives a copy of the decision, not from the date it was served upon the provincial fiscal.