Tan Tok Lee v. Court of First Instance of Kalookan City
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Respondent Cresencia M. Dulay filed an ejectment case against petitioners Tan Tok Lee and Nena Lee. Dulay alleged that she purchased the property, a parcel of land with a residential house, from the previous owners, the Espiritu spouses. The Espiritus had informed the petitioners, who were lessees under the former owners, that their lease was over and they needed to negotiate with the new owner. Dulay claimed the petitioners had not paid rentals to the former owners for March, April, and May 1977, and continued to occupy the premises without her consent. She further stated she bought the property for her own residence and had informed the petitioners of her need to occupy it, but they refused to vacate. 2. Procedural History: The complaint was initially filed with the City Court of Kalookan City. The petitioners, in their answer, claimed the former owner refused their rental payments, leading to a petition for consignation. They also stated they tendered payment to the new owner, Dulay, who refused it, prompting them to amend their consignation petition to include her. After hearing, the City Court ordered the petitioners to vacate, pay monthly rentals, attorney's fees, and costs. The petitioners appealed to the Court of First Instance of Kalookan City, invoking PD No. 20. The Court of First Instance affirmed the City Court's decision, ruling that the petitioners were not tenants of the respondent and thus not covered by PD No. 20, and that the respondent, as the new owner, could terminate the lease under Article 1676 of the Civil Code. After their motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioners filed the present petition for review. 3. The Petition: Petitioners seek review of the Court of First Instance's decision, raising two issues: (1) whether the respondent can eject them given she is the new owner with no lease contract with them, and (2) whether the case is covered by PD No. 20. They argue that PD No. 20, which suspends Article 1673(1) of the Civil Code regarding judicial ejectment, protects them. However, the Court notes that PD No. 20 was not intended to deprive owners of their right to possess their property for extreme necessity, especially when the respondent bought the property for her own residence and the petitioners had allegedly promised to vacate. The Court also points to Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, which allows ejectment when the owner needs the property for their own use, thus upholding the respondent's right to recover possession.
Issue(s)
Whether the private respondent, as the new owner, can eject the petitioners from the premises despite the existence of PD No. 20 and other laws, considering there was no lease contract between them, and whether the respondent established a right to possess the property due to necessity. Whether the case falls under the coverage of PD No. 20, considering the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 (BP Blg. 25) and the petitioners' status as lessees of the former owners, not the respondent.
Ruling
The petition for review is dismissed. The decision of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. The petitioners are ordered to vacate the premises and surrender possession thereof to the respondent, to pay the latter P150.00 a month as reasonable rentals, plus attorney's fees and costs. The decision is immediately executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of ejectment, PD No. 20, and the respondent's right to possess: The Court held that Presidential Decree No. 20 (PD No. 20), which suspends the provisions of Article 1673(1) of the Civil Code regarding judicial ejectment, was not intended to deprive an owner of their right to possess and dispose of their property in cases of extreme necessity. The new owner, respondent Dulay, established her right to possess the property as she purchased it for her own residence and that of her family, who were also facing eviction. Witnesses testified that the petitioners had promised to vacate, which remained undisputed. The petitioners' refusal prejudiced the respondent, as she had no other place to live and faced potential eviction herself. Therefore, the petitioners' reliance on PD No. 20 was not well-taken, as it was not the intention of the decree to deprive an owner of the rightful use of her home, especially when the petitioners reneged on their promise to move out. On the applicability of PD No. 20, subsequent laws, and the petitioners' lessee status: The Court clarified that the rigid suspension of judicial ejectment under PD No. 20 has been relaxed by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 (BP Blg. 25). BP Blg. 25 explicitly allows judicial ejectment on the ground that the owner/lessor needs to repossess the property for his own use or for the use of his immediate family as a residential unit. This subsequent legislation upholds the right of the respondent to recover possession and use of her property. The Court further noted that the petitioners were not direct lessees of the respondent but of the former owners, and their month-to-month lease was with the previous owners, not the respondent. Consequently, they were not covered by the protective mantle of PD No. 20 in the same manner as a direct lessee would be, especially when the new owner has a clear and established need for the property.
Main Doctrine
A new owner, who purchased a property for her own residence and that of her family, can eject previous lessees who occupied the premises under the former owners, even if the lease was on a month-to-month basis, especially when the lessees failed to vacate despite demands and promises, and when the new owner's need for the property is established. Presidential Decree No. 20, which suspends judicial ejectment, is not intended to deprive an owner of the right to possess and use her property, and its application can be relaxed or superseded by subsequent laws like Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, which allows ejectment for the owner's personal use.