Cubar v. Mendoza
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners filed a complaint seeking the nullification of documents they allegedly signed under misrepresentation. They claimed to be "illiterate mountain people" induced to sign what they believed was a right of way for the government, but which turned out to be authorizations for private respondents to explore and exploit mineral resources on their land. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the documents null and void and awarding damages. Procedural History: No appeal was filed within the reglementary period, prompting petitioners to file a motion for a writ of execution. The trial court granted this motion. Subsequently, private respondents, through new counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration and to quash the writ, arguing invalid service of the decision. The respondent judge, presiding over a different branch due to the original judge's appointment to the Court of Appeals, set aside the order of execution. The Petition: Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to annul the respondent judge's order and to prevent further proceedings, arguing that the decision was already final and executory due to valid service on the counsel of record.
Issue(s)
Whether the service of the decision upon the wife of the counsel of record at his given address was valid. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the order of execution and quashing the writ. Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed within a reasonable period.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious. The writ of certiorari is granted, annulling and setting aside the questioned Order of the respondent judge. The writ of prohibition is also granted, prohibiting the respondent judge from further acting on the case except to order the execution of the subject decision. The temporary restraining order is made permanent.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of service of the decision: The Court held that the service of the decision upon the wife of Atty. Romeo Gonzaga, private respondents' counsel of record, at his given address on November 23, 1979, was valid. It was not disputed that the wife had previously received notices for her husband at that address and that he had complied with them. The Court emphasized that notice should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address, absent proper notice to the court of a change of address. Furthermore, a lawyer's withdrawal as counsel must be through a formal petition, which was not done by Atty. Gonzaga. Therefore, he remained the counsel of record, and service upon him was legally binding on the private respondents. On grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the order of execution: The Court found that since the decision was validly served on November 23, 1979, and no appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, the decision became final and executory. The Court reiterated the established rule that once a judgment is final and executory, the prevailing party has a right to its execution, and the granting of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. Consequently, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the questioned order without any legal or factual justification to warrant the stay of execution. On the timeliness of the petition: The Court dismissed the private respondents' claim that the petition was filed late. It clarified that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, as governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, does not have a fixed time frame for filing and may be filed within a reasonable period. The Court found the period within which the petition was filed to be reasonable under the circumstances.
Main Doctrine
A decision becomes final and executory upon valid service to the counsel of record. Once final and executory, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court, and any order setting aside such execution may constitute grave abuse of discretion.