Peran v. Espera
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the ownership and possession of an unregistered residential land. The property was originally owned by Jose Evasco, who partitioned it among his heirs. One heir, Alejandro Evasco, received the subject property and later sold it to Jose E. Torella, who then sold it to Jose Enriquez Sabater. Petitioner Angel P. Peran acquired the land from Sabater. Private respondents, Encarnacion Evasco and Ramon Espera, occupy a portion of this land with their house, claiming lawful possession for over twenty years, which they assert originated from Encarnacion's grandfather, Jose Evasco. Petitioner demanded they vacate and remove their house, but they refused, leading to legal action. 2. Procedural History: Petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Illegal Detainer against the private respondents before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona. This court ruled in favor of the petitioner, ordering the respondents to vacate and return possession of the property. The private respondents appealed this decision to the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II. The Court of First Instance reversed the municipal court's decision, dismissing the case on the grounds that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction because the action was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period, which the court determined began from the sale of the property in 1972. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Angel P. Peran filed a Petition for Review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. The petition raises a question of law, specifically whether the respondent court erred in determining the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The petitioner argues that the one-year period for filing the illegal detainer action should have been reckoned from the date of demand made upon the respondents in January 1979, not from the 1972 sale. The petitioner also challenges the respondent court's assumption that prior possession, regardless of character, is protected by law, contending that possession by mere tolerance does not confer a right against the owner, especially when demand to vacate is refused.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent court erred in reckoning the one-year period for filing the action for illegal detainer from the date of sale (December 31, 1972) instead of the date of demand (January 1979). Whether the respondent court erred in ruling that prior possession, regardless of character, is protected by law in an illegal detainer case.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The assailed Decision of the respondent Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 1227, is SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona is hereby reinstated.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the one-year period of limitation: The Court held that the one-year period for filing a forcible entry and unlawful detainer action commences from the time of demand to vacate. In this case, the demand was made in January 1979, and the ejectment suit was filed on February 8, 1979, which was well within the one-year period. The respondent court erred in reckoning the period from the sale in 1972, as the private respondents' possession was by mere tolerance of the petitioner's predecessors-in-interest. Such possession, while lawful initially, becomes illegal when the possessor refuses to vacate upon demand by the owner. The Court emphasized that a possessor by tolerance is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, and failure to do so justifies a summary action for ejectment. The ruling in Pangilinan vs. Aguilar and Yu vs. De Lara was cited to support the principle that a possessor by tolerance must vacate upon demand, and the refusal to comply makes their possession unlawful. The Court clarified that it is not necessary to have a formal lease agreement for an unlawful detainer suit against a possessor by tolerance, nor is prior physical possession by the petitioner an indispensable requisite. On the issue of prior possession: The Court found the respondent court's ruling that "whoever has prior possession, no matter in what character, is protected by law" to be erroneous under the factual circumstances of the case. The private respondents failed to prove their title or right to possess the portion they occupied. Their possession was by mere tolerance of the petitioner's predecessors-in-interest, which does not vest them with a right that can be asserted against the petitioner. The validity of the partition of the property, which adjudicated the lot to Alejandro Evasco, the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, was never challenged. Therefore, their claim of prior possession did not grant them legal protection against the owner's demand to vacate.
Main Doctrine
Possession by tolerance becomes illegal when the possessor refuses to vacate upon demand by the owner, and an action for ejectment must be filed within one year from the date of demand.