Ducusin v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a lease agreement for a residential apartment. The lessor, Agapito B. Ducusin, leased a unit to the lessees, Virgilio S. Baliola and Lilia S. Baliola, on a month-to-month basis. The lease contract included a stipulation that the lessor could terminate the lease if his children needed the premises for their own use or residence. The lessor initiated termination proceedings, asserting that his son, Agapito Ducusin, Jr., required the apartment due to his impending marriage. 2. Procedural History: The lessor filed an ejectment suit against the lessees in the City Court of Manila, which ruled in favor of the lessor, ordering the lessees to vacate and pay certain sums. The lessees appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, which affirmed the City Court's decision. Subsequently, the lessees appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the CFI's decision, dismissing the ejectment complaint. The Supreme Court is now reviewing the Court of Appeals' decision. 3. The Petition: This case comes before the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari. The petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the lower courts' decisions. They contend that the lease contract was for a definite period (month-to-month) and thus not covered by P.D. No. 20, allowing for termination based on the lessor's need. They also assert that the evidence presented sufficiently proved their need for the premises for their son's residence and that the Court of Appeals improperly disregarded evidence related to the son's marriage and intention to reside in the Philippines, deeming it hearsay. The petition seeks to reinstate the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance.
Issue(s)
Whether a month-to-month lease agreement, with a stipulation allowing termination by the lessor if his children need the premises for their own use or residence, is considered a lease for a definite period under P.D. No. 20. Whether the lessor sufficiently proved by a preponderance of evidence that his children genuinely needed the leased premises for their own use or residence. Whether the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of fact of the lower courts by excluding evidence presented by the lessor.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstating and restoring the decision of the City Court of Manila, Branch XVI, as affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVI. The complaint for ejectment was granted.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether a month-to-month lease with a resolutory condition is a lease for a definite period: The Court held that a lease agreement with a month-to-month basis, containing a stipulation allowing the lessor to terminate the contract if his children need the premises for their own use or residence, is considered a lease for a definite period. This is because the term is ascertainable, even if its exact termination date depends on the occurrence of a specific event, namely, the need of the lessor's children. Such leases fall under the exception provided in Presidential Decree No. 20, which allows for judicial ejectment when the lease is for a definite period or when the fixed or definite period agreed upon has expired. The Court cited its ruling in Rantael vs. Court of Appeals to support this interpretation, emphasizing that the month-to-month nature, coupled with the resolutory condition, creates a determinate period. On the issue of whether the lessor sufficiently proved the need for the premises: The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the lessor failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence the need of his children for the leased premises. The Supreme Court gave weight to the testimony of Agapito Ducusin, Sr., who testified that his son, Agapito Ducusin, Jr., got married and needed the premises. The Court also considered the testimony of Arturo Ducusin, a brother, which could be considered under the rules on pedigree, and the presentation of the marriage certificate of Agapito Ducusin, Jr. and Adela Villacorta. The Court ruled that this evidence, when considered together with the letters from Agapito Ducusin, Jr. expressing his intention to settle in the Philippines, sufficiently proved the need and intention to reside in the leased premises. The Court found the Court of Appeals' exclusion of this evidence as hearsay to be erroneous. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals: The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion. This was based on the appellate court's reversal of the factual findings of both the City Court and the Court of First Instance by excluding competent, clear, and substantial evidence that was not hearsay, and by misapprehending the facts on record. The Court reiterated that findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are not conclusive when there is grave abuse of discretion, a misapprehension of facts, or when the findings are contradicted by evidence on record, as was the case here. The Court found that the appellate court's decision was grounded on speculation and a mistaken inference, warranting a review of both law and facts.
Main Doctrine
A month-to-month lease, where the lessor reserves the right to terminate the contract if his children need the premises for their own use or residence, is considered a lease for a definite period, and thus falls under the exception to P.D. No. 20, allowing judicial ejectment. The lessor must, however, prove by a preponderance of evidence that the need of the premises by his children is genuine and not merely speculative.