Robert Dollar Co. v. Tuvera
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Robert Dollar Company (petitioner) entered into a Reclaimed Land Lease Contract with the Philippine Government in 1930 over a parcel of land in Port Area, Manila. The contract stipulated that upon termination, all improvements would vest in the Government. The lease was extended and later renewed, with the renewal period extending up to June 6, 1984. Procedural History: The Acting Commissioner of Customs, Juan Ponce Enrile, gave notice of cancellation of the lease in 1967, citing public interest. The premises were turned over to the Bureau of Customs, and petitioner demanded payment for improvements. The Secretary of Finance, in 1974, limited the government's liability to improvements made after the contract's renewal in 1959. The Office of the President (OP), in O.P. Decision No. 1483, s. 1975, set aside the Secretary's decision, ordering payment for all improvements. A first motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Finance was denied in O.P. Decision No. 2926, s. 1977. Subsequently, the Secretary of Finance designated a representative to the Valuation Committee. However, six months after the denial of the first motion, the Acting Secretary of Finance filed a second motion for reconsideration. The OP, through Deputy Presidential Assistant Joaquin T. Venus, issued Resolution No. 1728, dated June 23, 1981, modifying the previous decisions and adopting the Secretary of Finance's original ruling. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing this resolution. The Petition: Petitioner seeks to annul Resolution No. 1728 for want of jurisdiction, arguing that the OP decisions had become final and executory, and that the second motion for reconsideration was pro forma and violative of Executive Order No. 19, s. 1966, which limits reconsideration to one per party.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondents Presidential Executive Assistants acted with manifest want of jurisdiction in entertaining the second motion for reconsideration filed by the Acting Secretary of Finance. Whether the decision of the Office of the President, as embodied in O.P. Decision No. 1483, s. 1975, as affirmed by O.P. Decision No. 2926, s. 1977, had already become final and partially executed, thus precluding its reversal or modification. Whether the phrase "termination of this lease" in Clause 15 of the contract refers to the expiration of the original 25-year period or the final termination of the contract, including its renewals.
Ruling
The petition is granted. O.P. Resolution No. 1728 is set aside as null and void for having been issued in manifest want of authority. O.P. Decision No. 1483, as affirmed by O.P. Decision No. 2926, is hereby restored.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court found merit in the petitioner's contention that the Presidential Executive Assistants acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the second motion for reconsideration. Section 5 of Executive Order No. 19, s. 1966, expressly states that "only one petition for reconsideration by any party shall be allowed," except for exceptionally meritorious causes, which were not invoked or demonstrated in this instance. The Court referenced Vito vs. Lacson, which similarly interpreted a rule prohibiting second motions for reconsideration, reiterating that while an executive body may alter its own decision, it must do so before the decision becomes final and executory. Therefore, the action of the respondents in giving due course to a prohibited second motion for reconsideration was a clear violation of the established procedural rules governing administrative appeals. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court held that the Reyes and Zamora decisions had attained finality and were, in fact, partially executed, thus removing them from the power of alteration by the Office of the President. After the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, Secretary Virata voluntarily ratified the decision by designating a representative to the 3-Man Valuation Committee, as mandated by the O.P. decisions. This act of compliance constituted partial execution of the judgment. The Court consistently adheres to the rule, established in cases like Verches vs. Rios, Desbarats vs. de Vera, Asian Surety and Insurance Co. vs. Relucio, and PVTA vs. delos Angeles, that a party who voluntarily executes, either partially or in toto, a judgment rendered for or against him, or who voluntarily acquiesces in its execution, is not permitted to appeal from it. Furthermore, citing Turquesa v. Hernando, et al., the Court underscored the dogma that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court or tribunal which rendered it to further alter or amend, much less revoke it, for reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, and the interest of litigants. On Issue 3: The Court adopted with approval the reasoning of O.P. Decision No. 1483 regarding the interpretation of the lease contract. It held that the phrase "termination of this lease" in Clause 15, which dictates when improvements vest in the government, refers to the final expiration of the contract, including its renewals, and not merely the original 25-year period. This interpretation was derived from Clause 7, which stated the lease would terminate "unless renewed or terminated under the provisions hereof," implying that renewal prevents termination at the original date. The Court also relied on Section 37 of Act No. 2874, which was incorporated into the lease and explicitly states that improvements vest in the Government "Upon the final expiration of the lease." Cases like Mercy's Inc. vs. Verde and Wolf v. Brook supported the view that a renewed contract is akin to a contract made for the full combined term. Given that the government itself used "extended" and "renewed" interchangeably, and the cancellation was under Clause 13 requiring payment for improvements due to public interest, the interpretation favored the payment for all improvements, whether introduced during the original or renewal period.
Main Doctrine
A second motion for reconsideration, filed beyond the reglementary period and without exceptionally meritorious cause, is void and may not be entertained by the Office of the President. Furthermore, a party who voluntarily executes, partially or in toto, a judgment or order, or acquiesces in its execution, is estopped from appealing or seeking reconsideration thereof.