Guanzon v. Montesclaros
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Respondents Ferdinand Briones and Rosario Briones initiated an ejectment suit against petitioner Manuel Guanzon in the City Court of Cebu. The suit sought to compel Guanzon to vacate the premises and to recover unpaid rentals, telephone bills, accrued and current rentals until vacation, interest on overdue rentals, moral and compensatory damages, and attorney's fees. The complaint detailed specific amounts for these claims, including accrued rentals of P4,711.59 and February-March 1977 rentals of P2,950.00, among other charges. 2. Procedural History: After being served with summons, Guanzon requested and was granted a 10-day extension to file an answer. However, he failed to do so, leading to an order of default on January 20, 1978. The respondents presented their evidence ex parte, and a default judgment was rendered on February 6, 1978, ordering Guanzon to pay P9,461.59 in principal and interest, P3,000.00 for attorney's fees, and P2,000.00 for damages and costs. Guanzon, after learning of the judgment upon being served with a writ of execution, filed several motions to lift the default order and set aside the judgment, all of which were denied. Subsequently, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to quash the writ of execution and set aside the default judgment. This petition was dismissed on February 25, 1981. 3. The Petition: Guanzon filed the instant petition for review with the Supreme Court, challenging the dismissal of his certiorari petition. He argued that the default judgment exceeded the amount prayed for in the complaint, violating Rule 18, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the dismissal, holding that certiorari was not the proper remedy as an appeal was available. The Court reiterated that a defaulted defendant who has not regained standing in court generally cannot appeal a default judgment from city or municipal courts, although recent rules have broadened appeal rights. The Court also found Guanzon's argument regarding the excessiveness of the award to be without merit, as the complaint included claims for ongoing rentals until vacation, which justified the awarded amount when considering payments made.
Issue(s)
Whether certiorari will lie to annul a judgment by default when the remedy of appeal is available. Whether a defendant declared in default, who has not regained his standing in court, can appeal a judgment by default. Whether the amount awarded in the default judgment exceeded the amount prayed for in the complaint.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which dismissed the petition for certiorari, reiterating the rule that certiorari will not lie where the remedy of appeal is available.
Ratio Decidendi
On the availability of certiorari: The Court reiterated the established rule that certiorari will not lie where the remedy of appeal is available. In this case, the petitioner failed to avail himself of the remedy of appeal from the order denying his motion to lift the order of default and set aside the judgment. The existence of an adequate remedy by appeal bars the institution of a special civil action for certiorari. The Court emphasized that where an appeal is a sufficient and adequate remedy that would promptly relieve the petitioner of the injurious effects of the order or judgment complained of, the existence of that appeal would bar the remedy of certiorari. On the right to appeal a default judgment: The Court affirmed the principle that a defaulted defendant who has not regained his standing in court has no right to appeal the judgment by default rendered by the city or municipal court. While a proper motion to set aside the judgment by default, when denied, may give the defaulted defendant the right to appeal, the appeal would be from the order denying the motion, not from the judgment by default itself. The defendant can only appeal from such judgment after regaining his standing in court. The Court clarified that the innovation allowing a defaulted party to appeal the judgment under Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable to municipal or city courts, citing Section 19, Rule 5. However, the Court noted that this pronouncement has been overruled by Section 22 of PD 129 and Section 21(a) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, which allow appeals from all cases decided by metropolitan, municipal, and municipal circuit trial courts to the regional trial courts, including judgments by default. On the amount awarded in the default judgment: The Court found no merit in the petitioner's claim that the amount awarded exceeded the amount prayed for. The complaint explicitly sought payment of rentals for current months until the defendant vacated the premises, in addition to accrued rentals. The respondent court correctly observed that the total obligation reached a certain sum, and after partial payment, a balance remained. The Court cited jurisprudence holding that the amount demandable and recoverable from a defendant in ejectment proceedings, regardless of denomination as rental or damages, flows from the detainer or illegal occupation and is merely incidental thereto, thus not affecting the court's jurisdiction.
Main Doctrine
Certiorari will not lie where the remedy of appeal is available. A defaulted defendant who has not regained his standing in court has no right to appeal the judgment by default, but may appeal the order denying his motion to set aside the default order.