Budlong v. Apalisok
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The petitioner, Salvador L. Budlong, Acting Third Assistant City Fiscal of Tagbilaran, filed an information against Camilo Puyo y Galagar for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. During arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to thirty days imprisonment, with no civil liability imposed. The accused then expressed his intention to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968. 2. Procedural History: Following the guilty plea and sentence, the petitioner filed a motion to present evidence on the accused's civil liability. The respondent court denied this motion, deeming it filed out of time because the accused had already applied for probation, and declared the case closed. A motion for reconsideration was also denied, with the court citing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1257 (amending P.D. 968) which it interpreted as suspending the execution of the sentence upon application for probation, thus precluding further proceedings on civil liability. 3. The Petition: This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the respondent court's orders denying the motion to hear civil liability and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioner argues that the respondent judge erred in deeming the motion out of time and in concluding that the Probation Law precludes the determination of civil liability. The petitioner contends that probation only affects the criminal aspect of the case and does not extinguish the offender's obligation to satisfy civil liability, as supported by relevant articles of the Revised Penal Code and previous jurisprudence.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge gravely erred in holding that the ex-parte motion to set case for hearing was filed out of time considering that the accused had already filed an application for probation. Whether the respondent judge gravely erred in denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Probation Law suspends the execution of the sentence, and whether proving civil liability after applying for probation nullifies the suspension of sentence and defeats the purpose of the law. Whether the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in opining that the prosecution should have asked leave to prove civil liability before judgment was rendered.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The orders dated February 11, 1982, and February 19, 1982, of the respondent court are set aside. The respondent court is ordered to set hearings on the civil liability of the accused.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the timeliness of the motion to prove civil liability: The Court held that the motion to set the case for hearing for the reception of evidence to prove civil liability was not filed out of time. Probation, as defined by Presidential Decree No. 968, affects only the criminal aspect of the case, specifically the execution of the sentence. The statutory definition of probation, which occurs "after conviction and sentence," signifies that it impacts the criminal aspect, not the civil liability. The filing of the motion the day after the judgment of conviction and the plea of guilty was timely, as it occurred before the accused began serving his sentence and while the court still had jurisdiction over the matter of civil liability. On the issue of whether proving civil liability after applying for probation nullifies the suspension of sentence and defeats the purpose of the Probation Law: The Court ruled that the respondent court erred in its conclusion. Presidential Decree No. 1257, amending Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, clearly provides for the suspension of the execution of the sentence upon application for probation. This provision pertains solely to the criminal aspect and has no bearing on civil liability. The civil action for civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action. The Court emphasized that under Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code, the obligation to satisfy civil liability continues notwithstanding the service of sentence or non-service due to various reasons, including probation. Denying the opportunity to prove civil liability would violate the victim's constitutional guaranty of due process. On the issue of whether the prosecution should have presented evidence for civil liability before judgment: The Court found no legal basis for the respondent judge's conclusion that the prosecution should have presented evidence for civil liability before rendering judgment. The general rule, as stated in Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, is that the civil action for civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved. In this case, the information specifically alleged physical injuries and stated that civil liability would be proved during the trial. The Court reiterated that civil liability is personal to the victim and distinct from the penalty for the crime. Therefore, summarily denying the motion and declaring the case closed and terminated constituted a violation of the victim's right to due process.
Main Doctrine
The grant of probation, which suspends the execution of a sentence, does not extinguish or affect the civil liability arising from the crime committed. The prosecution has the right to present evidence to prove civil liability even after a plea of guilty and application for probation.