People v. Borromeo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The original information for grave coercion alleged the commission of the crime on or about June 24, 1981. An amended information was filed and admitted, still stating the date as June 24, 1981. After the accused pleaded not guilty and during the complainant's testimony, it was revealed that the crime occurred on or about August 28, 1981. The prosecution then orally moved to further amend the amended information to reflect this new date. Procedural History: The respondent Judge denied the verbal motion to amend the information, citing the case of People vs. Reyes and stating that the proposed amendment would impair the substantial rights of the accused. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Petition: The People of the Philippines, through the Acting City Fiscal of Mandaue City, filed a petition seeking to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge denying the amendment to the information.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge erred in denying the prosecution's motion to amend the information to change the date of the commission of the offense from "on or about June 24, 1981" to "on or about August 28, 1981" after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea; and whether the proposed amendment was formal or substantial. Whether the proposed amendment would impair the substantial rights of the accused.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The orders of the respondent Judge dated June 30, 1982, and July 28, 1982, are set aside, and the respondent Judge is directed to admit the amendment to the amended information changing the date of the offense from June 24, 1981, to August 28, 1981.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of amending the information after arraignment and whether the amendment was formal: The Court held that the respondent Judge erred in relying on the case of People vs. Reyes. The proposed amendment, changing the date of the commission of the crime from June 24, 1981, to August 28, 1981, was considered more formal than substantial because the difference in dates, approximately two months and five days, is comprehended within the phrase "on or about." Such an amendment would not alter the nature of the offense of grave coercion, as established in Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno. The Court reiterated that amendments that do not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or prejudice to the accused are considered formal and permissible. The Court distinguished the present case from People vs. Reyes, where the proposed change in date was from 1964 to 1969, a five-year gap deemed too great for approximation. In the instant case, the two-month and five-day difference falls within the reasonable approximation allowed by "on or about." The Court also emphasized that the error was discovered early, and the motion to amend was made immediately, further negating any surprise or prejudice. The ruling in Vega vs. Panis was also cited, which held that an amendment is formal if it does not adversely affect any substantial right, alter the nature of the offense, or require a material change in the defense. The amendment here fits this description, as the precise time is not a material ingredient of grave coercion. On whether the amendment would impair the substantial rights of the accused: The Court found that the amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused. The accused had been furnished with the affidavits of prosecution witnesses, all of which uniformly stated that the date of the commission was August 28, 1981. This uniformity would preclude any surprise. Citing U.S. vs. dela Cruz, the Court noted that amendments that do not affect the essence of the crime but merely an accidental detail, and do not deprive the accused of an opportunity to present evidence for their defense, are not prejudicial. Furthermore, Section 10 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that the precise time of the offense need not be stated unless it is a material ingredient, and the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date as possible.
Main Doctrine
An amendment to an information after arraignment, which does not alter the nature of the offense, does not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused, and does not cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, is considered a formal amendment and is permissible.