Borromeo v. Pogoy
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo owned a building leased by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo. Private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate, demanded payment of overdue rentals and thereafter filed an ejectment suit against petitioner. Procedural History: Petitioner moved to dismiss the ejectment case, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's failure to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon as required by PD 1508. The respondent judge denied the motion, stating that the acceptance of the case by the Clerk of Court, with payment of docket fees, met the precondition. The Petition: Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to stop the respondent judge from proceeding with the case, contending that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.
Issue(s)
Whether the Municipal Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the ejectment suit for failure to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation. Whether the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo, as the real party in interest, is considered an "individual" for the purpose of PD 1508.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The respondent judge is ordered to try and decide Civil Case No. R-23915 without unnecessary delay.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the Municipal Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the ejectment suit for failure to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation: The Supreme Court held that PD 1508 makes conciliation at the Barangay level a condition precedent for filing actions where it applies, with certain exceptions. The Court noted that the respondent judge acknowledged Circular No. 22, which directs courts to desist from receiving complaints falling within the authority of the Lupons. However, the judge overlooked the failure of the complaint to allege compliance with PD 1508 and did not cite any circumstance placing the suit outside the law's operation. The Court found the respondent judge's justification, based on the Clerk of Court's acceptance of the filing, insufficient, especially when the Clerk of Court disclosed the absence of a certification to file action from the Lupon or Pangkat secretary. On the issue of whether the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo, as the real party in interest, is considered an "individual" for the purpose of PD 1508: The Supreme Court clarified that PD 1508, under Section 4(a), requires referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon only when the parties are "individuals." The Court defined "individual" as a single human being, as contrasted with a social group or institution. Therefore, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons and not where any of the parties is a juridical person, such as a corporation, partnership, or an estate under administration. In the present case, while the administrator, Atty. Ricardo Reyes, was the nominal party, the real party in interest was the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. Since the said estate is considered a juridical person, the plaintiff administrator could file the complaint directly in court without coursing it through the Barangay Lupon for arbitration. The Court found the private respondent's justification for not availing himself of the barangay conciliation process, citing the Statute of Limitations, to be unsatisfactory, as the period for filing an ejectment case had not yet expired.
Main Doctrine
The requirement for referral to the Barangay Lupon under PD 1508 is not applicable when the real party in interest is an intestate estate, which is considered a juridical person, allowing direct filing of the action in court.