Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Dayrit

G.R. No. L-63372 · 1983-06-28 · J. ABAD SANTOS, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Commercial
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: This case originated from a civil action filed by Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) against Metallor Trading Corporation, Lorenzo M. Sarmiento, Jr., and Marcelino Ty. The plaintiff, RCBC, sought to recover a sum of money from the defendants. In a decision rendered on July 6, 1982, the trial court ruled in favor of RCBC, ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay RCBC P300,000.00, plus interest, service charges, penalty fees, attorney's fees, and costs. The defendants' counterclaim was dismissed. 2. Procedural History: Following the trial court's decision, RCBC filed a motion for the execution of the judgment on October 21, 1982, asserting that the judgment had become final and executory. In response, the defendants filed a motion on October 27, 1982, seeking to have their appeal admitted and the motion for execution denied. They attributed the failure to file a timely appeal to the personal and family problems of their counsel, Atty. Elmer D. Nitura, which led to his negligence. Despite RCBC's opposition, the respondent judge issued an order on November 24, 1982, denying the motion for execution and admitting the defendants' appeal, directing that the records be forwarded to the Court of Appeals. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. 3. The Petition: RCBC filed the instant petition seeking to annul the respondent judge's order dated November 24, 1982, arguing that the judge lacked jurisdiction to issue it. The petitioner contends that the defendants' appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period, as the decision was received on August 13, 1982, and the motion to admit appeal was filed on October 27, 1982, well beyond the thirty-day period prescribed by Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner argues that the judgment had become final and executory, and the remedy, if any, would have been under Rule 38, which was also unavailable due to the lapse of time. The petition further highlights that the defendants' failure to appear after presenting only one witness suggested an abandonment of their case, and that the negligence of their counsel was inexcusable, with clients being bound by such consequences.

Issue(s)

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated November 24, 1982, annulling the decision dated July 6, 1982, which had become final and executory; and whether the defendants' failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period could be cured by a motion to admit appeal, citing excusable negligence of counsel. Whether the defendants' remedy for the alleged negligence of counsel was proper, and whether the alleged excusable negligence of counsel is a valid justification for failing to file a timely appeal.

Ruling

The petition is granted. The order of the respondent judge dated November 24, 1982, is annulled and set aside, and the respondent judge is directed to issue a writ for the execution of the judgment.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of the finality of the judgment and the attempt to cure the failure to appeal: The Court held that the defendants' counsel received a copy of the decision on August 13, 1982, giving them thirty days to appeal. The motion to admit appeal on October 27, 1982, was filed after the judgment had become final. Failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period results in loss of jurisdiction, and subsequent attempts cannot restore it. The Court cited Alvero vs. De la Rosa, emphasizing that rules of procedure regarding the time for appeal are mandatory. The loss of the appeal was attributed to the unjustified neglect of counsel, and the clients must suffer the consequences of such neglect. Furthermore, the Court observed that the defendants had presented only one witness and subsequently failed to appear in subsequent hearings, suggesting they had abandoned their own case, raising doubts about the substance of any appeal they might have filed. On the issue of the defendants' remedy and the alleged excusable negligence: The Court stated that even if the allegations of negligence were meritorious, the proper remedy would have been a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, even this remedy was unavailable because more than sixty days had elapsed from the notice of the judgment to the date of their motion. The Court stressed that rules of court have the force and effect of law and are indispensable for the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business, requiring strict compliance. The Court found no merit in the defendants' claim of excusable negligence, noting that Atty. Nitura could have asked his partners to attend to the appeal. The Court reiterated the principle that failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period results in the loss of jurisdiction, and subsequent attempts to certify the record on appeal cannot restore lost jurisdiction.

Main Doctrine

A judgment becomes final and executory upon failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period. The remedy for such failure, if due to excusable negligence, is relief from judgment under Rule 38, which also has its own time limitations.

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