Aparri v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On January 15, 1960, the Board of Directors of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) approved Resolution No. 13, appointing petitioner Bruno O. Aparri as General Manager, effective January 16, 1960. Subsequently, on January 22, 1960, the Chairman of the Board issued a letter of appointment to petitioner. The power to appoint the General Manager was vested in the Board of Directors, subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines, as provided in Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 1160. Procedural History: On March 15, 1962, the NARRA Board approved Resolution No. 24, fixing the term of office of the General Manager up to March 31, 1962, pursuant to the desire of the Office of the President. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction on March 29, 1962, seeking to annul Resolution No. 24, to compel the Board to allow him to continue in office, and to claim damages. While the case was pending, Republic Act No. 3844 abolished NARRA and transferred its functions to the Land Authority. The Court of First Instance dismissed the case, deeming it academic due to the abolition of NARRA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that petitioner's cessation from office was due to the expiration of his term, not a removal. The Petition: Petitioner seeks review of the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that Resolution No. 24 constituted a removal without cause.
Issue(s)
Whether Board Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) constituted a removal or dismissal of the petitioner without cause. Whether the term of office of the petitioner expired on March 31, 1962.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that the term of office of the petitioner expired on March 31, 1962, and his cessation from office was not a removal but an expiration of his term, which the Board of Directors had the power to fix.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether Board Resolution No. 24 constituted a removal or dismissal without cause: The Court held that Resolution No. 24 did not constitute a removal. Removal entails the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of their term. In this case, the Board of Directors, pursuant to the desire of the President, fixed the term of office of the petitioner as General Manager of NARRA to expire on March 31, 1962. This act of fixing the term of office was within the power of the Board of Directors as provided by law. The Court emphasized that a public office is created by law and does not confer a vested right or an estate in the office. The petitioner's appointment, while initially lacking presidential approval, was later regularized by the Board's Resolution No. 24, which effectively fixed his term. Therefore, the cessation of his service was not an ouster but a consequence of the term's expiration. On the issue of whether the term of office of the petitioner expired on March 31, 1962: The Court affirmed that the term of office of the petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. The term of office is defined as a fixed and definite period of time during which an officer may hold office. While the law (R.A. 1160) did not initially fix the term of the General Manager, it vested the power in the Board of Directors to appoint and fix the term of office, subject to presidential approval. Resolution No. 24, approved by the Board and pursuant to the President's desire, legally fixed the petitioner's term to expire on March 31, 1962. Upon the expiration of this fixed term, the petitioner's right to hold the office ceased ipso facto, as provided by law and jurisprudence. The Court cited Mechem on Public Officers, stating that upon the expiration of an officer's term, unless authorized to hold over, their rights, duties, and authority must cease.
Main Doctrine
The expiration of a fixed term of office, as validly fixed by the appointing power in accordance with law, does not constitute a removal from office. A public officer's right to hold office ceases ipso facto upon the expiration of his term.