People v. Dela Cruz
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: A search party found the lifeless body of barrio captain Amadeo Orejudos in the mountains, covered with branches, leaves, and earth. An autopsy revealed multiple incised and lacerated wounds, including a deep incised wound across the neck severing blood vessels and trachea, and several wounds causing skull fractures. Procedural History: Lorenzo Tuvera and Cornelio dela Cruz were initially investigated as they were last seen with the victim. Tuvera pointed to dela Cruz as the killer, and after initially denying, dela Cruz admitted responsibility and led the police to a hut where the victim's .22 caliber revolver was recovered. Both were indicted for murder qualified by treachery and robbery. Matias Guleng was also indicted for murder, accused of offering dela Cruz P4,000.00 to kill Orejudos. The Petition: Lorenzo Tuvera was discharged to become a state witness. His testimony detailed how dela Cruz clubbed the victim with a piece of wood, then took the victim's gun. Dela Cruz then ordered Tuvera to help drag the body to a creek, where dela Cruz hacked the victim's neck and nape with the victim's bolo. They then covered the body with branches, leaves, and earth. The trial court found Cornelio dela Cruz guilty of murder and robbery. Matias Guleng was acquitted due to reasonable doubt. Cornelio dela Cruz appealed.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in accepting and giving weight to the testimony of co-accused Lorenzo Tuvera who turned state witness. Whether the confession of the appellant was admissible despite claims of force and intimidation. Whether the appellant was properly informed of his right to silence and to counsel at the time of custodial investigation.
Ruling
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with the modification that the indemnity awarded to the heirs of the deceased is increased to P30,000.00.
Ratio Decidendi
On the admissibility and weight of the state witness's testimony: The contention that the testimony of co-accused Lorenzo Tuvera, who turned state witness, is subject to grave suspicion and not entitled to credence is devoid of merit. An accused is a competent witness for or against a co-accused, and their discharge from an information does not affect the quality of their testimony. The admissibility, relevancy, and weight are determined by the Rules on Evidence. It has been held that the uncorroborated testimony of an accused, when satisfactory and convincing, may serve as the basis for a conviction of a co-accused. The trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and assessed Tuvera's testimony as convincing and credible. Furthermore, Tuvera's declarations were corroborated by the appellant's own affidavits, wherein he admitted killing the deceased and revealed the location of the stolen gun, which was subsequently recovered by the police. On the admissibility of the confession despite claims of coercion: The appellant's attempt to repudiate his confession on the ground of force and intimidation is untenable. He claimed to have been mauled and tortured but failed to identify his alleged torturers or file charges against them. He admitted signing the two affidavits and swearing to their truth before a judge, without ever complaining of maltreatment. The judge propounded questions to the appellant during the preliminary investigation, and his answers confirmed the facts stated in his affidavits. These circumstances strongly contradict the allegation of coercion and duress. On the right to silence and counsel: The claim that the appellant had not been informed of his right to silence and to counsel at the time of the custodial investigation is unavailing. This constitutional objection cannot be sustained because the confession in question was obtained prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. The ruling in Magtoto v. Manguera (63 SCRA 4) is relevant here, establishing that constitutional objections regarding rights to silence and counsel are not retroactive.
Main Doctrine
The uncorroborated testimony of an accused discharged as a state witness, if satisfactory and convincing, may be the basis for a judgment of conviction against a co-accused. A confession obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution is not rendered inadmissible by the lack of informing the accused of their right to silence and to counsel.