Tero v. Tero
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the ownership of a parcel of land of approximately 1.3610 hectares. The petitioners, Felix Tero, et al., children of Simeon Tero, claim ownership based on an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated March 15, 1917, executed by Felipe Juegos, selling the property to their father, Simeon Tero, who subsequently declared it for tax purposes. The respondent, Santiago Tero, an uncle to the petitioners, bases his claim on an affidavit by Magdalena Tero, stating that his parents, Fausto Tero and Gabriela Pacaldo, had purchased the property and that he, Santiago, sought to redeem it as an heir of Fausto. The core of the dispute lies in conflicting claims of ownership originating from different alleged transactions and subsequent declarations of ownership and possession. Procedural History: The case traces a complex procedural history involving multiple legal actions. Initially, the property was declared for taxation by Simeon Tero. After Simeon's death in 1944, his children, the petitioners, claimed ownership. Santiago Tero declared the property in his name in 1953. In 1957, Felipe and Benjamin Amodia filed suit against Santiago and Felix Tero, claiming ownership, which was resolved by a compromise agreement in 1959, stating Santiago and Felix were co-owners. Subsequently, Felix Tero initiated a forcible entry case against Santiago in 1973, which was dismissed by the Municipal Court. Concurrently, Felix filed a complaint for quieting of title in 1974. The trial court ruled against Felix in the quieting of title case, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1980, which found Santiago had acquired ownership through acquisitive prescription. The Supreme Court is now reviewing this decision. The Petition: The petitioners, Felix Tero, et al., seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision through a petition for certiorari. They argue that the appellate court erred in concluding that Santiago Tero acquired ownership through acquisitive prescription. The petitioners contend that Santiago's possession was not in good faith and with just title, citing that he declared the property before allegedly redeeming it and that the basis of his claim, Magdalena Tero's affidavit, was not signed and unconfirmed. Furthermore, they assert that Santiago's possession was not peaceful and continuous, as evidenced by the Amodia suit and his own statements about being deprived of possession. Crucially, they argue that Santiago, as a co-owner, cannot claim prescription against his co-heirs as long as co-ownership is recognized, which he did until at least 1973 when he filed an answer in the forcible entry case.
Issue(s)
Whether Santiago Tero acquired ownership of the property through acquisitive prescription. Whether Santiago Tero's possession met the requirements of good faith, just title, peacefulness, and continuity for acquisitive prescription. Whether Santiago Tero, as a co-owner, could acquire title by prescription against his co-owners.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeals, declaring the petitioners (Felix Tero, et al.) as the actual possessors and rightful owners of the parcel of land. Tax Declaration No. 4301 in the name of Santiago Tero was ordered cancelled.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether Santiago Tero acquired ownership through acquisitive prescription: The Court held that the only way Santiago could have acquired title was through prescription, as sustained by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court found this conclusion untenable. The Court emphasized that ownership is acquired and transmitted by law, donation, succession, contracts, and tradition, and also by prescription (Article 712, Civil Code). While prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership, its application in this case was found to be flawed. On whether Santiago Tero's possession met the requirements for acquisitive prescription: The Court ruled that Santiago's possession was not in good faith and with just title. He declared the property as his on January 18, 1953, even before the alleged redemption from Magdalena Tero after November 6, 1953. Furthermore, under Article 1127 of the Civil Code, there was no reasonable belief that the person from whom he allegedly received the property was the owner, as Magdalena's affidavit indicated she was merely a mortgagee, not an owner. The unsigned nature of Magdalena's affidavit and its lack of confirmation in testimony also prevented any presumption of a grantor under Article 1129. Additionally, Santiago's possession was not peaceful, as evidenced by the Amodia Suit (August 6, 1957 to January 22, 1959) and his own statement about being deprived of possession. It was also not clear that he possessed the property for the total prescriptive period of ten (10) years. On whether Santiago Tero, as a co-owner, could acquire title by prescription against his co-owners: The Court found that the lower courts failed to consider Santiago's claim as that of one co-owner against others. When Santiago allegedly redeemed the property, he did so in representation of the heirs of Fausto, including Felix. Even if his claim had substance, he would only be a co-owner. The compromise agreement in the Amodia Suit also acknowledged Santiago and Felix as co-owners. The Court reiterated the principle that "No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership" (Article 494, Civil Code). The only time Santiago could be deemed to have denounced the co-ownership was when he filed his Answer in the forcible entry case on November 16, 1973, which was well after the alleged prescriptive period.
Main Doctrine
A co-owner cannot acquire title to the property through prescription against his co-owners as long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized. Possession by a co-owner, to ripen into ownership by prescription, must be in concept of owner, openly, publicly, adversely, and with just title and good faith, which are negated by the acknowledgment of co-ownership.