Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Private respondent Antonio P. So filed a collection case against petitioner Ernesto V. Ronquillo and three other defendants for P117,498.98, representing the value of dishonored checks issued for foodstuffs. The lower court, on December 13, 1979, rendered a decision based on a compromise agreement where the total claim was reduced to P110,000.00. The defendants agreed to pay P55,000.00 on or before December 24, 1979, and the remaining P55,000.00 within six months thereafter. Failure to comply would entitle the innocent party to an execution of the decision. 2. Procedural History: The plaintiff (now private respondent) filed a motion for execution on December 26, 1979, alleging non-payment of the initial P55,000.00 installment. Petitioner opposed, claiming the private respondent was inaccessible on the due date and tendered his pro-rata share of P13,750.00. Petitioner and another defendant deposited their shares with the Clerk of Court, which were withdrawn by the private respondent. The lower court ordered execution for the balance of the initial payment against the other two defendants. The private respondent moved for reconsideration, seeking execution against all defendants jointly and severally. On March 17, 1980, the lower court ordered a writ of execution for P82,500.00 against the defendants, singly or jointly liable, and scheduled a sheriff's sale of petitioner's properties. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on April 2, 1980. 3. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, seeking to stop the sheriff's sale and questioning the validity of the execution order, writ, and sale. He argued that the lower court's decision, based on a compromise agreement, did not establish a solidary obligation among the defendants, and thus, execution should not be against all of them jointly and severally for the entire unpaid amount. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as premature, finding that petitioner had not exhausted all remedies in the lower court. Petitioner sought reconsideration, arguing the lower court had already denied his motion for reconsideration, making the issues ripe for appellate review. This motion was also denied. The present petition for review to the Supreme Court raises the issues of whether the Court of Appeals erred in deeming the petition premature and in failing to resolve the substantive issue of whether the defendants' liability was joint or solidary.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was proper despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration in the lower court. Whether the liability of the defendants under the compromise agreement and the subsequent decision was joint or solidary.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying due course to the petition for certiorari. The liability of the defendants is considered individually and jointly, which means they are severally liable for the entire obligation.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Propriety of the Certiorari Petition: The Court reiterated the general rule that a motion for reconsideration must precede a petition for certiorari. However, this rule is not absolute and may be dispensed with when such a motion would serve no useful purpose, the error is patent, or the relief sought is extremely urgent. In this case, the petitioner faced imminent danger of his properties being sold at public auction on the same day his motion for reconsideration was to be heard. The resetting of the hearing to the same day as the scheduled sale, coupled with the denial of the motion for reconsideration by the lower court, demonstrated extreme urgency, justifying the immediate recourse to the Court of Appeals for a certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order to prevent the sale. To have waited would have rendered the remedy moot. On the Nature of Liability: The Court examined Articles 1207 and 1208 of the Civil Code, which state that solidarity is only implied when the obligation expressly states it or when the law or nature of the obligation requires it; otherwise, the debt is presumed to be divided equally. The compromise agreement, as approved by the lower court, stipulated that the defendants agreed to pay "individually and jointly." The Court interpreted "individually and jointly" to mean severally liable. Citing Parot v. Gemora and Un Pak Leung v. Negorra, the Court held that phrases like "juntos or separadamente" or "individually liable" in an obligation create a several obligation, where each obligor binds himself to perform the whole obligation. Therefore, the defendants were individually liable for the entire obligation, and the execution against petitioner's properties for the unpaid balance was valid.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari may be filed before the appellate court to restrain the execution of a lower court's order, even if a motion for reconsideration is pending, if the circumstances demonstrate extreme urgency, such as an imminent sale of properties, and the motion for reconsideration would serve no useful purpose.