Manikad v. Tanodbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents Guillermo M. Santos, Jr. and Bernardo S. Yambao, members of the EPZA Police Force, filed a complaint with the deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor, Benjamin T. Vianzon, against petitioners Gavino Manikad, Roberto Bañez, and Benito Arellano, director and members of the EPZA Police Force, for smuggling, qualified theft, violations of the Anti-Graft Law, and the Anti-Fencing Law. These offenses were allegedly committed inside the EPZA zones. Procedural History: Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss before the Tanodbayan prosecutor, arguing that the prosecutor lacked authority, the complaint was premature, and there was no prima facie case. The motion was denied. A motion for reconsideration and/or petition for review with the Tanodbayan was also denied. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioners argued that the Tanodbayan prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction, contending that the power to investigate such complaints is lodged exclusively with the EPZA under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A.
Issue(s)
Whether the Tanodbayan prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in conducting a preliminary investigation on a complaint for offenses committed inside the EPZA zones; and whether the power of the EPZA to investigate complaints of violations of penal laws committed inside the zones is exclusive, precluding the Tanodbayan from conducting a preliminary investigation. Whether the complaint filed by respondents Santos and Yambao was improperly and prematurely filed.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Tanodbayan prosecutor did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The power of the EPZA to investigate is not exclusive, and the complaint was not prematurely filed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Tanodbayan prosecutor's authority and the exclusivity of EPZA's power: The Court held that Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A, which grants the EPZA the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violations of penal laws committed inside the zones, does not confer exclusive authority. While the EPZA has "sole police authority" over the zones, the provision does not use similar language to describe its power to investigate and prosecute. Basic rules of statutory construction dictate that a meaning not reflected in the language of the statute cannot be imposed. Therefore, the EPZA's power to investigate does not preclude the Tanodbayan or his deputies from conducting a preliminary investigation on offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, such as violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and other crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office. The Court emphasized that the cited provision does not constitute an exception to or a limitation on the Tanodbayan's authority. On the issue of premature filing: The Court found the allegation of prematureness untenable. It reiterated the principle that the pendency of an administrative proceeding does not bar a criminal prosecution for the same offense, as administrative and criminal cases are separate and distinct proceedings that can proceed independently of each other. The filing of the complaint with the Tanodbayan prosecutor was therefore not premature simply because it involved offenses allegedly committed by EPZA police officers within the zone.
Main Doctrine
The power of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) to receive and investigate complaints relative to violations of penal laws committed inside the zones is not exclusive and does not preclude the Tanodbayan or his deputies from conducting a preliminary investigation on such complaints.