Valisno v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Private respondent Antonio N. De Dios filed two separate complaints for a sum of money with replevin against petitioner Leandro D. Valisno. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-30974, was filed on October 6, 1980, and the second, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-31014, was filed on October 8, 1980, also against petitioner and an unidentified John Doe. These cases were consolidated for decision by the lower court. 2. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a single decision adverse to petitioner on September 24, 1981. Petitioner appealed this decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) by filing separate notices of appeal, paying separate appeal bonds, and submitting separate records on appeal for each case. The IAC subsequently issued a notice to file brief in AC-CV No. 00148-R (RTC-Q-30974). Petitioner's counsel sought a ninety-day extension to file the brief but was granted only forty-five days. After receiving this resolution on the last day of the extension, counsel filed another motion for a fifteen-day extension. While awaiting a resolution on a motion to file a consolidated brief, petitioner filed his brief on July 21, 1983. The IAC, by resolution dated August 11, 1983, dismissed the appeal for being filed fourteen days beyond the extended reglementary period. A motion for reconsideration was denied. 3. The Petition: Petitioner seeks a review of the IAC's resolution dismissing his appeal. He argues that practitioners have relied on an established policy of automatically granting a ninety-day extension for filing briefs, and the IAC's departure from this policy without notice disrupted his timetable. Petitioner contends that the IAC should have exercised sound judicial discretion, considering the ends of justice and fairness, and admitted the brief, especially since it had already been filed and demonstrated a meritorious defense. He also highlights that his motion for a consolidated brief was intended to expedite the resolution of both cases.
Issue(s)
Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal for the late filing of the brief. Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court should have admitted the brief filed by the petitioner, considering the circumstances.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The questioned resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 11, 1983, is SET ASIDE, and the respondent Court is ordered to ADMIT the appellant's brief and to proceed with the consideration of the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the dismissal of the appeal for late filing of the brief: The Court held that the granting of an extension of time for filing briefs is a matter of judicial discretion. However, this discretion must be exercised soundly and judiciously, considering human situations and pressing circumstances that warrant a relaxation of the rules. The exercise of discretion should be predicated on serving the ends of justice and fairness. In this case, the petitioner's counsel received the resolution granting a forty-five (45) day extension on the last day of the original period. Immediately thereafter, another motion for a fifteen (15) day extension was filed and granted. The brief was filed only fourteen (14) days beyond this final extended period. The Court noted that practitioners relied on an established policy of automatically granting one ninety (90) day extension for filing briefs, and a sudden departure from this policy without notice could disturb their timetable. The Court also considered the petitioner's intention to expedite the resolution of the two cases by filing a consolidated brief, which indicated no intent to delay. On whether the brief should have been admitted: The Court found that the brief had already been filed when the appeal was dismissed. Therefore, the respondent Court should have adopted a liberal attitude by admitting the brief, especially since it showed the meritorious defense of the petitioner. The Court reiterated its pronouncements in previous cases, such as Ferreira vs. IAC and Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, emphasizing that the failure to file a brief within the allotted time does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of the appeal. The Appellate Court retains the inherent power and discretion to amend its orders to render substantial justice.
Main Doctrine
The granting of extension of time for filing briefs is a matter of judicial discretion, which should be exercised soundly and judiciously with an understanding of human situations and pressing circumstances, and always predicated on the consideration that the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby. The dismissal of an appeal for late filing of a brief may be reconsidered liberally, especially when the brief shows a meritorious defense.