Cruz v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Jose Cruz, as executive vice president and general manager of Baliuag Electric Light and Power Co., Inc., filed three separate complaints for alleged estafa against respondent Cesar Santiago. These complaints stemmed from a P2,000 check issued by Santiago as partial payment for an P14,733.60 electric bill, which check was dishonored upon presentation to the bank. Santiago was the manager of the ice plant owned by his father. Procedural History: The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan dismissed the estafa complaint on January 3, 1973, for being civil in nature. Subsequently, Santiago was advised to report to the Philippine Constabulary Headquarters and the Civil Relations Office regarding the same complaint. These agencies also dismissed the matter upon being advised of the Fiscal's resolution. Thereafter, Santiago instituted a civil action for damages against Cruz, alleging malicious prosecution, lack of probable cause, and malice. The Petition: The Court of First Instance of Bulacan awarded damages to Santiago. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed this decision, concluding that Cruz's actions were primarily intended to harass or vex Santiago. This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the appellate court's decision.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of criminal complaints for estafa, which were subsequently dismissed, constitutes malicious prosecution. Whether petitioner acted without probable cause and with malice in filing the said complaints.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The decision of the respondent appellate court is set aside. Costs against the private respondent.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of malicious prosecution: The Court found no factual or legal basis to conclude that petitioner's filing of his complaints was primarily intended to harass or vex the respondent. The Court noted that a certification from the Philippine Constabulary indicated petitioner had not filed nor signed any complaint, but even disregarding this, the act of filing a criminal complaint for estafa due to a rubber check issued by the respondent, in petitioner's capacity as an official of the electric company, cannot be deemed malicious or an act of harassment. Petitioner was merely pursuing his company's lawful cause of action for what he believed to be a criminal act of issuing checks without funds. The same reasoning applied to complaints filed with the Philippine Constabulary and the Civil Relations Office for assistance. On the issue of probable cause and malice: The fact that the subject matter of the P2,000 check had not yet been paid up to the time of the trial court's proceedings further supported the petitioner's position. Malice and bad faith cannot be presumed and must be proven. Furthermore, at the time the complaints were filed, the legal question of whether issuing a bouncing check constituted estafa under the Padilla amendment of Article 315, Section 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, even if in payment of a pre-existing obligation, was unsettled. This Court's definitive negative ruling on this matter came much later in People vs. Sabio, Sr., Liap vs. Court of Appeals, and Lagus vs. Hon. Cusi, Jr. (86 SCRA 568) on November 20, 1978. Given this jurisprudential uncertainty, petitioner's act of pursuing his criminal complaint could not be considered tainted with malice, as many cases were filed under the premise that such an act was criminal swindling. The subsequent enactment of B.P. Blg. 22 on April 3, 1979, making the issuance of a check without sufficient funds a special criminal offense, further contextualizes the situation.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a criminal complaint for estafa due to a dishonored check, even if later dismissed, does not constitute malicious prosecution if the complainant acted in good faith and pursued what he believed to be a lawful cause, especially in the context of evolving jurisprudence on bouncing checks.